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DEFEND OUR MARINES ________________________________________ LCpl Justin Sharratt Statement to NCIS Haditha Dam, March 19, 2006 |
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Below, left: Diagram by LCpl Sharratt, referenced in the statement. Below center and right: Two reconstructions of vehicle positions after the blast. |
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__________________________ I am currently a LCPL assigned to 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3/1, 1st Marine Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Haditha Dam, IZ. I joined the Marines in JUL03 and reported to my current Command on FEB04. We deployed 10 Haditha in Sep05 and are due to return to Camp Pendleton around 01 APR 06. I received training for assaulting buildings, which we call Military Operations Urban Terrain at. March AFB, CA and at other facilities which are documented in my Service Record Book. That training basically taught me when assaulting a hostile building you start, off stacked against a wall with a fire (four individuals). Second man in the stack preps a frag and throws into the first room. The first-two men then rush into the room each man covering his sector. We push to any danger area which could be other rooms, doors, stairwells. And we repeat the process at each danger area. There is also a tactic called clearing by fire. That tactic is where you stick your weapon around a corner minimizing your body exposure and firing from inside to outside of the room until the person shooting sees fit that they have put enough rounds inside the room. Which is the tactic has been utilized property and now sees fit to enter the room. I have been trained to identify a hostile person by if they were showing hostile intent, had a weapon, or if you. feel that they pose a threat to yourself or other Marines. If an area is declared that we are taking hostile fire from, then basically anyone in. that area can be deemed as the enemy and shot at. The training I received I always either had it as a hostile situation requiring use of firearms or explosives, or it was non hostile where we were not suppose to use deadly force to begin with. Basically, our training we do receive aims more towards immediate reaction to certain situations. And the situation on 19Nov05 in my eyes was IED explosion followed by small arms fire gave me the incentive that it was hostile area to use any means necessary and my training to eliminate the hostile threat. So positive identification was not used on 19Nov05 because the area was deemed hostile and we went into the rooms firing to clear them before any enemy inside could shoot us. On 19Nov05, I was involved in a convoy that delivered Iraqi soldiers and CPL PEGUSE, USMC to Temporary Check Point (TCP) on River Road in Haditha, IZ. My convoy consisted of four HMVs and the first HMV was driven by LPCL RODRIQUEZ and the front seat passenger was CPL SALINAS. I was the turret gunner on the vehicle, which was a Hardback HMV. I think CPL PEGUSE was riding as a passenger in our vehicle. The second vehicle was a Highback HMV with CPL DELA CRUZ as the driver and LCPL TATUM as the front passenger. LCPL MENDOSA was -in the cargo area with about two or three Iraqi soldiers. The third vehicle, which was a highback HMV, was driven by SSGT WUTERICH and LCPL GRAVISS was riding in the front passenger seat. HN WHITT was riding in the cargo area with about two or three Iraqi soldiers. The fourth and last vehicle was a highback HMV and it was driven by LCPL Terrazas with the front seat passenger as LCPL CROSSAN. LPCL GUZMAN was riding in the rear cargo area. We left Firm Bass Sparta sometime in the morning. I am not sure of the time but I think, it was around 0700. The sun had just risen and there were some clouds, but all in all it was a clear day. We left Sparta via ECP 1 and drove down Haditha and took a left on Leopard. Then we crossed Chestnut and went into the desert on an unpaved road. We followed that until we hit Badger and then took Badger to the TCP which is just off River Road. The drive took us about 10 to 15 minutes, At TCP we dropped off CPL PEGUSE so he could change the crypto on the com gear and we dropped the Iraqi soldiers and pickup up about six Iraqi soldiers. They went into the same HMVs the Iraqi soldiers had left, which was vehicle 2 and 3 of our convoy. That took about 15 minutes and then we departed TCP in the same formation of the convoy that we had been in when we left Firm Base Sparta. We then headed north on River Road and. turned left to the west on Chestnut. My vehicle was 100 to 125 meters west of Zebra on Chestnut when I heard the IED go off destroying vehicle four of our convoy. I have drawn a map which is attached to this statement, V1A represents my vehicle, which was vehicle one and V1B represents where my vehicle was after we repositioned it following the explosion in an attempt to cordon off the area. Just before the explosion I had a white four sedan approaching my vehicle from the west. Heading east on Chestnut. Chestnut is a two lane road and that vehicle was to the left of me. I signal for it to pull over and it did. I remember looking towards the driver. I can not recall now what he looked like, but at the time he appeared to be a normal driver and did not appear to be a threat. He pulled his vehicle about 5 meters off the side road and stopped to allow us to pass. The position of his car is also noted in my diagram as WC. The second HMV in our convoy was about 20 meters east of Zebra on Chestnut when the IED went off. The third HMV was about 30 meters west of Viper on Chestnut and the fourth HMV was about 40 to 50 meters east of Viper on Chestnut when it was destroyed. As soon as the explosion occurred, and I do not-know the exact time of the day but it was still morning, our vehicles stopped immediately. I had been in condition three on my 240G and when the explosion occurred I racked the bolt to the rear and went into condition 1. I then started scanning in front of me looking for a threat. Almost immediately, I could hear gunfire close to the rear of my vehicle. The gunfire initially sounded like AK-47 rounds. There appeared to be about 10 rounds of AK then I heard M-16 rounds going off then there was a volley of fire that went on for about 30 seconds and then started to dwindle down stopping about a minute after -it had started. I hunkered down in my turret and could not see what was happening behind me. From what I heard later, there was the explosion then enemy gunfire from the houses to the south of us which was followed by our return fire at the houses and then the Iraqi Army firing at the white car as the occupants began to run away from the convoy. I had heard that some of the M-16 fire had been directed at the fleeing passengers of the Iraqi white car; however, I do not know who fired the M-16. SALINAS had left my vehicle about 5 seconds after the explosion. He ran back east but I do not know what he did or where he went. I assumed that he was going to assess the explosion. My vehicle remained in its position for about two minutes and then we backed my vehicle and vehicle two in order to cordon off the area. Vehicle 2 backed up only about 20 meters and my vehicle backed up about 150 meters to almost the intersection of Viper and Chestnut. I have drawn this on the diagram which is listed as V1B for my vehicle and V2B for vehicle two. After making this maneuver Quick Reaction Force from Sparta arrived and picked up the casualties from Vehicle 4 and then went to LZ Bull for the MEDEVAC. I remember LT KALLOP arrived on the scene and he remained with us. I remained in my vehicle turret gun for another minute or two and then I saw CPL SALINAS and LCPL MENDOZA running into a depression south of me and heading to a group of houses that were about 150 to 200 meters [away]. I thought they were too small of a group and needed help so I undid my 240G and got out of the vehicle to join them. As I started into the depression I saw SALINAS and MENDOZA at the bottom of the depression heading towards the top and then I noticed SSGT WUTTERICH and LCPL TATUM on the far side coming out of the depression near a group of buildings. As I started into the depression I had asked where did the shooting come from and I heard yells that it was coming from the south of us. As I followed the above individuals I assumed that they had seen or heard the shooting coming from the buildings they were heading to. In hindsight, I did not hear any shooting at us after I got out of my HMV for the rest of that day. I did not see any weapons pointed at us until I went into the house that I will later describe in my diagram that is listed as house four. So I ran to catch up with SALINAS and MENDOZA and the rest of the described above Marines. When I got out of the depression, I walked around the west side of a house being built that was in front of house 1 on my diagram. I was looking for the above Marines and found them as they were entering house 2. I heard a gunshot go off and I posted myself at a corner of house number 2 as noted on house 2 diagram, I do not know what the order the Marines went into the house but I waited about five seconds before I followed them into the house. I remember they had entered via a kitchen doorway and as I stepped into the doorway I saw a dead adult male lying inside the kitchen near the doorway. I heard several grenades go off and I remember hearing "Bad Frag" being called out. I stayed in the doorway for about 5 seconds and men I heard "Marine Exiting" which told me they were coming out. While in the doorway I did not see anyone in the kitchen other than the dead guy. I do not know where the other Marines had gone but as soon as I heard Marines starting to leave the building in my direction I immediately walked out of doorway and went so the far corner of the patio and waited for the Marines to exit the building also. They did so almost immediately, I think they spent maybe 30 seconds tops in building number 2. Then my overall diagram that has our vehicle positions noted, continues to show that we left house 2 and walked over to a -building north of house 1 that was locked. I tried kicking the door open but was unable to so I shot the padlock off the door with my 240G and I entered the building. I can not recall who else walked into the building with me, but it was a tiny house and no one was inside nor did I see any weapons inside. Then I exited that building and followed everyone across the street of Zebra and checked out a vacant building as noted in my diagram. The building was locked but we did not have to enter is because we could see through the windows and tell that there was no one inside. Then we crossed the street again and walked over to house number 1 on my diagram. I do not recall the order we went in and we did it on the fly. We were not stacked when we enter the building. The door we enter was the south side door and it was the door nearest to house 2 on my diagrams. I believe the door was already open when we went in and I think I was second to the last to enter the building. I can not recall who was behind me, but I remember someone threw a grenade into the first room on our right. I am not sure who threw the grenade, but I think it was TATUM. Any rate, after whoever threw the grenade said clear by fire. I waited for the grenade to go off and then I stuck my 9mm Beretta pistol around the corner of the door jam and fired blindly into the room firing from fatal front to dominate corner. Which is basically from right to left. I emptied a magazine into the room and then holster the pistol and used my 240G and stepped into the doorway and scanned the room. I remember seeing a couple of bodies of what appeared to be adult males lying to the immediate right of me. I did not see anyone standing so the room was clear and I stepped out of me doorway and followed my footsteps back out of the building the same way I had entered. I remember everyone else exited the way but I can not recall the order we were in. I think maybe three or four grenades were thrown in that house and I heard other gunfire but I do not know what happened in the other rooms. I have been told by Special Agent Robert McDaniel that my sequence of shooting in the above house appears to be out of order with other statements given. I may have my sequence out of order, however, as I am giving this statement the above events is what I can remember. After exiting diagram house 1 we walked North on Zebra to Chestnut and I returned to my parked HMV and dropped off my 240G and picked up a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). I stayed with my vehicle for about 10 to 15 minutes and then LT KALLOP wanted us to check out a building which was near the intersection of Chestnut and Zebra on the north side. I went to the building with SSGT WUTERICH, SALINAS, TATUM and I believe ROURIGUEZ. We knocked on the door and a female answered and we searched the house and then left. We did not find any weapons or take detainees. We did not assault the house because we did not receive fire from the house or see any suspicious activity. We returned to our vehicles arid reported to LT KALLOP. We remained at our vehicles less than a half hour. Then I, CPL SALINAS, and SSGT WUTERICH went on top of the OP that was just northeast of Chestnut and Viper intersection as marked on my attached diagram of the area. We had been up there for about five minutes when I saw an adult Iraqi male wearing all black running very fast from the top of the far side of the Wadi (depression) from area of House 1 and 2 and running east towards River Road. I told CPL SALINAS what about the running male and be told me to engage it. He did not give a reason but I felt it was okay to shoot at him because we had been attacked, the individual was wearing black like the insurgents do, and he was running. So I shot at him using my SAW and CPL SALINAS shot at him using his M-16. We must have hit him because he dropped when he was about 60 meters from building one and he did not move where he lay. No one went to him to render aid because we thought we had killed him. KALLOP heard the gunshots and asked what happened and we yeled back to him that we shot a MAM He replied something like, ''Good to go" or something to that extent. I have no clue. if the MAM wag medically treated. About 20 minutes later that time period LT KALLOP and SALINAS had gone over to houses 1 and 2 on my diagram to do a casualty assessment. While that was going on SSGT WUTERICH [said?] that there was possible enemy movement over to the west Zebra and he wanted someone to come along with him. I volunteered walked with him South on Zebra past the vacant house we had searched on our right. It was about 50 meters south on Zebra, when we stopped and SSGT WUTERCH kneeled and I went prone. I had my SAW' and WUTR1CH was armed with an M-16A4 with iron sights. We did not have any binoculars and were looking west when WUTERICH saw what appeared to be an Iraqi male running. I can not recall what he was wearing, but he did have a red and white checkered scarf wrapped around his head. He was 200 to 300 meters away and he was .running west away from us towards some houses. I did not see a weapon and no one had shot at us. WUTERICH took his first shot but missed, I went to fire because WUTERICH had fired, but my weapon failed to fire and jammed. WUTERICH took a second shot and hit the individual and I saw him fall. At that point LT KALLOP, who was at house; number 2, shouted at us that we were firing at friendlies and to cease fire. We got up and went back to our vehicles. No one checked on the individual WUTERICH and shot and I am unaware of anyone doing so later. We did not go over to the body because it was too far from our security zone to do so. I believe 2nd squad had radio that we shot the individual and I think that is why LT KALLOP came out of house 2 to tell us to stop firing. I think WUTERICH shot the individual because I .think he had been told there was possible enemy in that area and when he saw this individual running, then he assumed him to be the enemy. I never asked WUTERICH why he shot the individual and I never talked to LT KALLOP about the individual being shot. This individual was shot about a half hour after the IED explosion on our convoy. After we returned to our vehicles we stayed for about five minutes and then I, SSGT WUTERICH and CPL SALINAS went to our Observation Point (OP) that was established at the vacant house northeast of Viper and Chestnut intersection. We went on top of the roof. We were on the roof for about an hour and then EOD showed up and accessed the explosion site of the IED. About 10 minutes after EOD showed up, me, WUTERICH and SALINAS left the roof and walked over to the eastern side of Viper at the intersection of Viper and Chestnut. We went over there to perform security on the detainees that had been formed there. There were at least seven or eight detainees. They were all adult males. We were there with them for about 15 minutes and then went back to the OP. While on the OP we watched helos fire multiple Hellfires in support of Weapons platoon from Sparta: At that point I noticed that some Iraqi males were looking over the wall in front of their residence which is marked as house four on my sketch. This was suspicious because they were watching us and then duck away from us when they saw that we were watching them also. This went on for about 10 to 15 minutes with the males looking at us and ducking away. They did that act quite a few times. Special Agent McDaniel claimed that SALINAS said it was females looking at us, but I am responding no, that they were male. There may have been one or two times a female looked at us, but the vast majority of the time were males. I do not remember any males or females actually leaving behind the walls and walking into the streets. We did not receive and gunfire from that location either. But about 10 to 15 minutes of them peeking at us SALINAS tired a M203 training round at the wall in front of the house. At that point I saw two men leave the wall in front of house 4 and run into house 4. About 5 minutes later they started doing same activity of watching us from their wall in front of their [house]. They continued to peek at us and then try hide when we were looking at them for another 15 minutes. Then we decided to check out and see why they were doing it. I believe I was in the lead and SSGT WUTERICH and CPL SALINAS followed me to house 3 and 4 on my diagram. There was a wall about 6 tall in front of house 3 and 4 that paralleled Viper. There was a gate somewhere in front of house 3 and house 4 that would allow you in. Initially, I thought the two houses were actually one and I went through the gate for house three and walked up to the front door. The door was closed but unlocked, so I opened it up and went in to search. As I entered building I began to search all the rooms. There were at least four or five females in the building and at least four or five children also. There were no adult males and I remember remember WUTERICH or SALINAS talking to them. Standard operating procedures is that you ask if there are any weapons, “Enta Salah”, and then you ask “Entaabus” which means father or husband and is what we say when we are looking for males. WUTERICH and SALINAS called me over and I think it was SALINAS who said the women were claiming the men were next door. So I stepped outside and somehow WUTERICH and SALINAS had decided that SALINAS was going to stay in the residence with the females while WUTERICH and I checked out house 4 with the males. So I was in the lead and walked on the interior side of the wall running the length of the buildings. I had my SAW and 9mm and WUTERICH followed me with his M-16. The front door, as described in my diagram of house 4, was open and I entered the building and proceeded into the center meeting room and WUTERICH followed me. As I was stacking myself next the far door jam of the room that allows access to the interior hallway and stairwell, I saw directly across from the hallway an Iraqi male was pointing a shoulder AK-47 at me as though he was about to shoot me. I shouldered my SAW and attempted to fire but it jammed. As I tried to get behind the wall of my door jam I saw the Iraqi male do the .same. I then let my SAW hang on my sling; and drew my 9mm pistol and out past the door jam to be waiting for the individual if he presented himself at the time. I do not recall saying anything to the Iraqi and I think I said "Jam" so WUTERICH would know my SAW isn't working. Then the Iraqi came out for behind the door jam and was raising his AK-47 when I shot him once in the face and he fell backwards. I immediately stepped forward into that bedrooms doorway and while doing so I could hear an AK-47 racking its chamber. I stepped into the doorway and saw either three or four adult males. They were in the corner of the bedroom to my left and the front Iraqi male had the AK-47 waist level as though he had just completed racking it. I immediately fired at his chest and head firing several times. I may have hit him in the chest and head and he was about 2 feet away. After shooting him I continued to shoot the other three that were still standing behind the Iraqi male I had just shot with the AK rifle. I could not tell while I was shooting if they were armed or not but I fell threatened because of the first two individuals had rifles and I assumed they had some sort of weapon also. I kept firing until my magazine was empty because I did not know if they had body armor on or not. When I ran out of ammo I said "I'm out" and. side step to my right and SSGT WUTERICH came in on my left and fired five to seven shots into the bodies on the ground to make sure that none were capable of grabbing a weapon and firing back at us. We had that concern because I was uncertain if we had shot them all enough to stop them from fighting us. I had been aiming at their heads and chest and I know at the time of firing that I hit a couple in the head. After WUTERICH stopped firing I grabbed the two AK rifles and put them in the hallway. I did not find any more weapons. I found a live AK-47 shell casing with the primer indented. The round was lying in the room about a foot from the door way next to the closet. Closet was made of wood and positioned along the wall immediately to the left when entering the room. All the individuals shot after the first two were in the left corner near the above closet. I believe I did not get shot by the first Iraqi because I think he had a malfunction of either his weapon or round. While clearing the weapons, they all had a round in their chambers and were ready to fire with what appeared to be full magazines. I put the spare round in a magazine and while we were searching the house further, I found a suit case with about three or four passports in it on the couch in a room marked on my diagram for house 4. Those items were all placed in my HMV but I do not know what happened to them after that. After clearing that house SALINAS left the females and came over to house 4 front doors because he heard the shots. We told SALINAS what happened and we three walked back to my HMV and dropped off the suitcase and weapons. While at the HMV I told TATUM what happened so that he could report to LT KALLOP what had happened. After doing that we went to the OP and we stayed there rest of the day. A wrecker came by and got the wreaked HMV and 3rd Squad arrived around dusk and started picking up the bodies at the various houses. CPL SANCHEZ leads third squad and we remained in the area providing security. I did not help in picking up the bodies. At around 2200 it was decided that my squad was to patrol back to Firm Base Sparta on foot and we did so leaving 3rd squad to continue policing the area. There were no incidents on the way back to Firm Base Sparta. Special Agent McDaniel asked me if heard anyone, to include SSGT WUTERICH and CPL SALINAS, say that the houses to the south of us were hostile, therefore not to worry about Positive Identification when engaging the enemy or words to that effect. I did not hear anyone say anything like that. It could have been said at the beginning because as they were crossing the Wadi I was trying to catch up with them. McDaniel advised me that my account of shooting at the Iraqi males were running outside buildings as described above was not included in my statement to the U.S. Army COL on 19Feb06. Those omissions were not intentional. I had forgotten a lot of what happened until McDaniel and I sat down to do this statement. The Army COL on 19Feb06 did my statement in an hour and did not attempt to try and help us to remember what happened. It was just a quick interview and statement. This statement, consisting of this page and seven others was typed for me by Robert A McDaniel as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. Justin Louis SHARRATT Sworn to and subscribed before me this 19th day of March 2006 at Haditha Dam, IZ.
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