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On 19
November 2005, 3d Platoon, Company K, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was
acting as the supporting effort 2 in Haditha, Iraq. Our task was to
carry out any working parties in the firm base as assigned by the
Company Gunnery Sergeant, run administrative convoys, and have a quick
reaction force (QRF) on stand by at all times. One of our platoon
taskers was to conduct a convoy to the Kilo Company Traffic Control
Point (TCP) in the Banir Dahir area to drop off Iraqi Army Soldiers to
run the check point, pick up the ones who had been there the previous
day and conduct a crypto change for the TCP platoon’s radios.
At
approximately 0700 I was standing as the Kilo Company watch officer in
the company combat operations center (COC). I had been on duty for the
night and was in the process of conducting changeover with my platoon
sergeant. Staff Sergeant Fields. I was filling him in on the events of
the night when we heard a large explosion outside. There was a few
second delay before we heard the call for the QRF on the radio.
I heard
Spartan 3/1 say something along the lines of, “IED, IED, we need QRF
on Chestnut.” We called the QRF runner and I ran to get my gear on.
After I had geared up I went back to the COC where SSgt Fields was
briefing Cpl Sanchez (the QRF squad leader). He told us that there had
been an IED on Chestnut and that 3/1 had one urgent and two routine
casualties that needed to be evacuated to LZ Bull.
We ran
out to the vehicles and Cpl Sanchez yelled out the situation to his
fireteams as I got into the vehicle. We drove west out of Entry
Control Point (ECP) 1 and turned south on Leopard which is a straight
shot to Chestnut. At that time I did not know that anyone had been
killed and remember thinking we were lucky. Spartan 3/1’s radio
traffic was reporting the vehicle that had been hit was destroyed and
I was wondering how that was possible with two routines. We drove
directly south to Chestnut and turned east toward the convoy. When we
rounded the corner and could see them Cpl Sanchez directed his vehicle
directly to the IED site, which was shrouded in smoke.
When I
dismounted the vehicle I went directly to the lead vehicle in Spartan
3/1’s convoy to get the situation from then Sergeant Wuterich, the on
scene commander until I arrived, where he was talking on me VRC. He
told me that mere had been small arms fire from the north directly
after the IED but not any more and that the rear (fourth) vehicle had
been hit. So I went back to me detonation site and ordered Cpl Sanchez
to turn his vehicles around and be prepared to load up the casualties
when the corpsmen had finished and take them to LZ Bull. I then went
[to] the blown up vehicle and saw HNs Whitt and Hatch working on Lance
Corporal Crossan who was pinned under me tire of the vehicle. Private
First Class Guzman was sitting against the vehicle and Corporal
Salinas was standing by the vehicle. I asked him where the third
casualty was and he pointed to Lance Corporal Terrazas who had been
killed and was on the street a few meters to the west.
At the
time I asked Sergeant Wuterich where he had security set, he told me
we were good, so I tried to help the corpsmen with LCpl Crossan. At
that time they had him unpinned from the vehicle and had him on a
stretcher so we backed a vehicle from the QRF up to him and loaded him
on. It was about that time when we began receiving small arms fire
from the south side of the road. Corporal Salinas told me to get down
and I got behind the blown up HMMWV with Sergeant Wuterich. I looked
out to the south and identified where the rounds were coming from with
Sergeant Wuterich. They were coming from a house that was across a
wadi on the south side of the road and a little to our west. I could
see movement and hear the rounds cracking around me so I pointed at
the house and told Staff Sergeant Wuterich to clear south to the enemy
and that I would be there as soon as the casualties were away safe.
At that
time Sergeant Wuterich gathered a team of Marines and began moving
toward the house. Corporal Sanchcz’s QRF was still there and he tried
to join the stack forming up but I caught him and told him to get his
squad to the LZ. At that point I realized that we would need more
Marines to secure the site so I went to the lead vehicle to use the
VRC and called Spartan Main. As I was on the radio me QRF pulled away
with LCpl Crossan, PFC Gonnan and both corpsmen. I also saw Sergeant
Wuterich’s team breach the house. LCpl Sharratt had a M240G dismounted
and was suppressing the house as the stack closed with it. I lost
sight of me team after they rounded a wall and LCpl Sharratt ceased
fire and moved in with the team.
While
on the radio I gave a situation report (sitrep) to Spartan Main. I
told them that we had (1) urgent and (1) priority on their way to LZ
Bull, that there was one K1A on site, and that we had taken fire from
our south and were in the process of clearing it but that we needed
another squad on scene. The watch officer told me that a squad from
Spartan 1 was en route and would be taking River Road.
I then
went to try to catch up with Sergeant Wuterich’s team but about
halfway there Lance Corporal Graviss called me back and told me that
he thought he had found the trigger house for the IED. I walked back
across Chestnut where the Lance Corporal Rodriguez and an Iraqi Army
soldier were in the process of detaining two military age males (MAM)
who had been in the area. I stopped to tell Rodriguez, who by that
time was the only Marine left with the vehicles, to detain every MAM
in the area to be questioned by HET.
LCpl
Graviss took me directly north of the detonation site to a house about
75 meters off the road and separated from the road by a wadi. There is
a finished portion of the house on the north side and a wing that is
still under construction to the south. He took me through the empty
part first and showed me an Iraqi sleeping mat in an otherwise totally
empty room right in front of a window that faced the road and was in
line with a telephone pole. He then took me to the front side where he
and Corporal Dela Cruz had assembled all of the people in the house. I
told them that was reason enough to search the house and told them to
turn it inside out and keep me updated, and I was going back to the
south.
I left
the house and started towards the road while calling another sitrep to
Spartan Main when I heard more AK fire. I reported that to Spartan
Main and began running to the south. About halfway I heard Machine Gun
fire and knew that Sergeant Wuterich’s team was suppressing so I
called Spartan 4 at the TCP and told them we were suppressing south
and to hunker down as I ran south. By the time I got to the road all
firing had ceased. On the road there were about five detainees and an
Iraqi Soldier was beating one with a stick. I took it away from him
and yelled at him not to hit them, but to guard them and continued
running across the wadi to our south, where I threw the stick, and
linked up with Sergeant Wuterich. He told me that after clearing the
first house there had been more enemy fire directed at him from the
south so he had continued clearing in order to close with and destroy
the enemy. I did not ask if they had gotten them because we were no
longer receiving fire so I told him to pull back and get overwatch set
over the detonation site and that I would call the wrecker.
All the
Marines pulled back and I got on the VRC and requested a flatbed to
come get the blown up HMMWV because it had been destroyed and un-towable.
At that time I was told by Spartan Main that the squad from Spartan I
had found an IED on River Road and had received fire from the palm
groves so would not be able to get to our position for a while and
that Spartan 3/2 was en route, clearing through the desert to our west
with Spartan 6 (Captain McConnell) and would clear to our south in
order to ensure the enemy had not gotten away and that 3/1 would not
have to over extend.
I then
walked back toward the detonation site where the detainees were being
staged and found the same Iraqi Soldier hitting a detainee with the
stick that I had confiscated earlier. I confiscated the stick again
and told LCpl Rodriguez and LCpl Tatum to make sure the IA didn’t beat
them anymore.
Sergeant Wuterich had posted overwatch on the north side of Chestnut
at the intersection of Viper and I walked back to Cpl Dela Cruz and
LCpl Graviss’ position. They had found a number of Jordanian
passports, approximately 15, two cell phones (one of which had been
disassembled) and a large amount of cash which according to them the
woman had tried to hide during the search. So I called the HET team
(Sgt Laughner) and gave him the situation and began taking pictures of
all the MAMs in the house with the items that had been found.
I left
my camera with Cpl Dela Cruz to finish taking pictures and walked back
to Chestnut. On my way there was another burst of AK fire directed at
the Marines in the overwatch position, and I saw a MAM in all black
running from behind one of the houses that had been cleared down into
the wadi on the south of the road. Believing he had been the shooter I
fired my weapon at him and when he disappeared into the wadi I
directed the overwatch’s fire onto him.
When I
got to Chestnut I linked up with Corporal Salinas and told him to take
me to the houses they had cleared. The first one we went to was the
original one we had taken fire from and that I had pointed Sergeant
Wuterich toward. Inside we found a number of dead people in the family
room in the back of the house, to include women and some children. I
looked around the room searching for weapons when one of the children
moved and I noticed that he and a little girl with him was still
alive. I got them up and saw that they had been hit by shrapnel so I
tried to get them to come outside to a corpsman but they would not go.
At that point I decided that I had to keep going and that I would come
back for them. Cpl Salinas took me to the next house to the south and
as we began to make entry there was more gunfire on Chestnut. We
bounded back toward the road when Spartan 3/2 told us that they were
coming down from the north and to cease fire. I saw Sergeant Wuterich
and LCpl Sharratt firing to the west on Chestnut and told them to
cease fire because 3/2 was over there.
I then
walked to their position where there was a white four door sedan with
the doors open and four dead MAMs a few meters to its south. I asked
Cpl Salinas what had happened and he told me that they had been parked
on the side of the road before the IED had detonated, they had stayed
and observed after the IED had detonated and while the Marines had
tried to cordon the area and that when Marines showed their weapons
and yelled at the MAMs in the car to get out so they could detain them
they opened the doors and attempted to run away. He said that he
thought they were the triggermen or connected to the attack because
they had been suspicious before and then failed to comply with the
Marine’s directions so they had been shot.
At that
time the ambush site had been secured and I told Sergeant Wuterich to
consolidate, and post security. At that time I heard Spartan 4 on the
radio, they were in contact with the enemy to our south and needed an
LZ for a MEDEVAC. I called Spartan 6 and told him that I had two
civilian children that I wanted to MEDEVAC as well. Their wounds were
routine, but their family was dead and I did not want them staying in
that room and I did not have any corpsmen on site to do a complete
assessment. I wanted to get them to a hospital to make sure they would
be okay physically and would have someone take care of them.
Spartan
6 said that he could facilitate that so I got Lance Corporal Rodriguez
to come with me and we went back to the first house off Chestnut where
we picked up the children and brought them to a highback that was from
the original convoy. We put them in with and Iraqi soldier so he could
talk to them and let them know that we were going to take care of
them. I then applied a pressure bandage to the girl’s shrapnel wound
in the leg and prepared to move to the LZ.
At that
time I left Sergeant Wuterich in charge of the ambush site and LCpl
Rodriguez and I drove south to Spartan 3/2’s position to facilitate
MEDEVAC. However, once we arrived and I had linked up with Spartan 6
we found out that Spartan 4 had taken more casualties, and we thought
that we may have to maneuver for them so MEDEVAC got delayed. That
Cobra gunships and bombs being dropped also delayed the MEDEVAC, but
we finally got an Army Dust-off into our hasty LZ where we evacuated 3
Marines, the 2 children and 1 MAM that had been engaging Spartan 3/1
from the west and Spartan 3/2 had
seen trying to egress from the ambush site as they came in from the
north and shot.
After
the helicopter was away safe Captain McConnell, Spartan 3/2, LCpl
Rodriguez and I all consolidated at the original ambush site where
Titan 2 (truck platoon) was picking up the blown up HMMWV and where
Tiger 1 (a section of tanks) had just arrived. With weapons platoon
still in contact Capt McConnell ordered me to get a squad and head
south to reinforce them. I told Sergeant Wuterich that he was now in
command of security of the IED site and told Sergeant Wolf to get his
squad with two vehicles and the tanks and we all moved south down
River Road to consolidate with Weapons Platoon. Once there we
coordinated with Sergeant Rafael’s squad from Weapons Platoon and
cordoned a house that air assets had tracked one of the insurgents run
into from the weapon’s engagement. The insurgent exited the house
holding a baby in front of him as a shield and we detained him. |