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The composite aerial photo at left shows the position of the
vehicles at the time of the shooting.
1. White taxi, five suspected insurgents were shot.
2. Vehicle 1 with Cpl Salinas, LCpl Sharratt, LCpl Rodriguez.
3. Vehicle 2 with LCpl Tatum, Sgt Dela Cruz, Pfc Mendoza.
4. Vehicle 3 with SSgt Wuterich, LCpl Graviss, Doc Whitt.
5. IED site with wreckage of Vehicle 4. LCpl Terrazas was killed. LCpls Guzman and
Crossan were wounded.
NOTE: Unidentified Iraqi soldiers also rode in the Humvees.
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The Marines knew a major insurgent attack was coming.
Intelligence was specific: multiple IED attacks were planned and a
white sedan carrying insurgents would be part of the ambush.
The insurgent attack was launched on the morning of 19 November 2005,
in Haditha, Iraq.
An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was detonated under the last
vehicle in a four-vehicle convoy, travelling down Route Chestnut. Prior to the explosion, LCpl Sharratt waved to an
oncoming white sedan to pull over as the convoy approached. This was standard
practice.
LCpl Terrazas was killed in the blast. LCpls Crossan and Guzman were
wounded.
An ambush: undisputed facts
Numerous witnesses said the Marines came under fire after the
convoy was hit with the IED. (The fire was coming from the north, and
a building later identified as House 1 was identified as the source.)
SSgt Wuterich spotted and moved toward
the white sedan as he heard
Sgt Dela Cruz yell at the occupants of the vehicle. The five
men exited the vehicle leaving
the doors open. Two men who exited on the driver side moved to the other side of the vehicle.
The five men did not respond to Sgt Dela Cruz’s directions. At least one man began
to either run or move further away from the car. SSgt Wuterich took a knee and
began firing. At the same time Sgt Dela Cruz opened fire on the men from a position to the
north and rear of the vehicle. Each of the five men fell from gunshot
wounds. Sgt Dela Cruz then moved toward the bodies and fired
additional rounds into each body.
From the Investigating Officer's report
After exiting his vehicle following the blast, SSgt Wuterich noticed the white
sedan and five men inside. These
men exited the vehicle and all moved to the left front passenger side
of the
car. The men were spread apart by several feet and distance from the
car. It is most probable that
someone was yelling at them and SSgt Wuterich believed that they were
a threat to him and his
Marines. The known facts at the time were:
-
An IED
exploded killing one Marine and injuring two others;
-
A quick reaction
force was on the way to help respond to the attack;
-
Small arms fire
began either outgoing or incoming;
-
A white sedan was
the only civilian vehicle on the road before the IED exploded;
-
Five men exited a
parked white sedan within 100 meters of the convoy;
-
The five men left
the vehicle doors open;
-
Sgt Dela Cruz’s
vehicle was directly North of the white sedan;
-
The five men
displayed no weapons or immediate threat to the convoy;
-
The white
sedan was within the area of the IED which could have been a VBIED or the location of a remote to
detonate the IED
-
The situation was
fast developing and chaotic.
-
Marines were
trained that an IED blast is a hostile act and that deadly force is authorized in capturing
suspected triggermen for the IED
Five dead insurgents
The initial reports (including the first Time magazine article
by Tim McGirk) stated that 15 civilians had died in Haditha following
the ambush on the Marine convoy. The five men at the white sedan,
along with the
four men inside House 4, were identified as insurg ents.
The investigation focused on the deaths of 24 Iraqis--irrespective of
their ties to the insurgency. It was Congressman John Murtha who first
claimed that the Marines had killed "24 innocent civilians"--not 15.
This was never true, as the LCpl Justin Sharrat case proved.
The five dead Iraqis at the white taxi were: Ahmed Kutar Museleh,
also known as Ahmed Fenr Muselh (identified by investigators as Number
16), Wagdi Aida Alzawi, also known as Wgedi Aida Abd
(identified as Number 17). Kaled Aida Alzawi, also known as
Kaled Aida Abd (identified as Number 18). Mohmed Tbal Ahmed
(identified as Number 19). Akram Hamid Flaeh, also known as
Akram Hmid Fluih (identified as Number 20).
Conflicting statements
Only one Marine is charged with the deaths of the Iraqis at the white
taxi, SSgt Wuterich. He is also the one man who never changed his
story, and whose story is supported by forensic evidence.
Cpl Salinas told the Army investigator, Col Watt, "We PID the
MAMs so, we started shooting and they all go down." But Salinas later
told NCIS that Sgt Dela Cruz was the only Marine he saw firing at the
taxi's occupants. So unless Cpl Salinas meant "we" in the sense of one
or more Marines, his two available statements are in conflict.
Sgt Dela Cruz admitted to shooting the five men but has always blamed
others for firing first. Initially, he blamed Iraqi soldiers. Then he
told NCIS that SSgt Wuterich had fired first and asked Dela Cruz to
lie.
Dela Cruz has major credibility issues as was revealed in the judicial
process. It's not believable that SSgt Wuterich asked Dela Cruz to lie when Wuterich himself told a different
story than the alleged "lie" to investigators.
Sources
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