I, Jeffery Scott DINSMORE make the following free and voluntary statement to Edmond B. Sweeney III and Sean Devinny whom I know to be a Representative of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of alleged violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict or rules of engagement resulting in the deaths of Iraqi national civilians on 19Nov05, in Haditha, Al Anbar Province, Iraq.

My duties as the Battalion Intelligence Officer were to be the senior intelligence adviser to the Battalion Commander, providing targeting advice, enemy force identification and disposition, enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as well as tasking of assigned intelligence collectors such as Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV), Human Exploitation Team (HET), Ground Sensor Platoon, Scout/Sniper Platoon and Radio Battalion.

On 19Nov05, my day began at approximately 0700 with the Battle Update Brief (BUB) where the Battalion Commander was briefed by various command staff members on significant events during the previous 24 hours. I briefed significant intelligence reporting including human intelligence and signals intelligence reports. At approximately 0720 the Command Operations Center (CoC) watch officer  CAPT DREGER interrupted me briefing to announce an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonation on KCO, Third Battalion, First Marine Regiment (KCO 3/1) in South Haditha, Iraq. No mention was made about casualties at this time, and the Battalion Commander, LTCOL CHESSANI instructed CAPT DREGER to keep him informed of the situation. The BUB ended at approximately 0730 when the Battalion Staff went to the CoC find out what was going on in Haditha. In the CoC with me was CAPT PULSKAMP, Air Officer, CAPT HAYNIE, Fires Officer, CAPT CHAMES, Coc watch officer, MAJ CARRASCO, Operations Officer, MGSGT Hernandez, Operations Chief, LTCOL CHESSANI, Battalion Commander and MAJ GONZALEZ, Battalion Executive Officer.

Immediately upon my arrival in the CoC I began to task the Intelligence assets and requested UAV (SCAN EAGLE) support for my Battalion. Reports began to filter in from KCO 3/1 and we learned there had been one Marine KIA and two Marine WTA in the initial IED explosion. We also received reports of from KCO indicating the patrol that had been hit by the IED were taking small arms fire (SAF) from both North and South of Route Chestnut. At approximately 0830 SCAN EAGLE was on station over Route Chestnut and River Rd. and the first video feed was of the area of where the HMMWV had been hit by the IED. I observed Marines on the ground that appeared to have set a security perimeter and my assessment was that the squad on Route Chestnut did not appear to be engaged with insurgents any longer. I recall seeing the HMMWV because a HMMWV was something I was use to seeing from the air, but do not recall seeing any other specific object on the ground. I immediately requested SCAN EAGLE move away from the area of Route Chestnut and River Rd. and begin to expand their area of coverage. My rationale in moving SCAN EAGLE was to determine if we could locate or observe other insurgent activity in the vicinity of the IED. It has been my experience in   Iraq that IED's can be put into one of two categories. The first is the IED of opportunity, which is usually placed by low-level insurgents and is a daily occurrence. The second and more rare is the more professional and better-planned attacks; which generally involves more than one type of attack. These attacks may include IED and SAP attacks in conjunction with each other, which we identified as a complex attack. On this day I immediately assessed this as a complex attack after hearing the report that the IED attack had taken place and that the squad involved was receiving SAF from both north and south of Route Chestnut. I believed more attacks may be coming and it was my job to provide indications and warnings and targeting information to the Battalion.

Between 0830 and 0900, as I directed the activity of SCAN EAGLE, we observed what appeared to be insurgents fleeing an area in the vicinity of Route Chestnut and River Rd. It was also about this time we received reports of a SAF ambush of EOD responders in. the vicinity of the Rafi Mosque. We followed this vehicle via SCAN EAGLE as it headed north with four Iraqi males in it. These four Iraqi males stopped their vehicle in the vicinity of the Rafi Mosque. Three other insurgents carrying weapons met the vehicle on Palm Grove Trail, they opened the trunk of the vehicle and either traded, unloaded or loaded weapons into the trunk of the vehicle. The three Iraqi males returned to the Palm Grove and we lost sight of them. My immediate assessment was this was a citywide attack coordinated between several insurgent teams working together. The vehicle carrying the four Iraqi males then turned back south along Palm Grove Trail and we followed them to what we later determined to be a safe house at about Route Zebra and River Rd. The four males parked and entered the safe house. We confirmed (positive identification) that these individuals were insurgents and began planning to engage these insurgents. The house was first engaged with Hellfire missiles and GBU bombs. Requests for air support were initiated by the Battalion CoC; I do not recall any request by KCQ for air or artillery support on 19Nov05 other than casevac. A squad from KCO then assaulted the house supported by a section from Weapons Company 3/1. I believe this support was also initiated by MAJ CARRASCO. As the squad moved through and assaulted the house, I observed two insurgents jump off the roof of the house. Those insurgents hid in a palm grove south of the house. It was during this assault that LT ZALL and other members of his squad were wounded by hand grenade attacks. The palm grove where the insurgents were hiding was engaged by two GBU bombs; after that explosion one insurgent emerged from the palm grove and began wandering the streets. We continued to observe him moving among local houses for the next approximately three hours. At approximately 1500 this insurgent entered a house and then emerged approximately five minutes later carrying two young children under his arms. A squad from KCO was then directed to that house and they were able to detain the insurgent. During the assault on the house several Marines were injured or wounded.  After the casevac of one of the Marines, I spoke with him and he told me just prior to the assault on the house the Marines were told they could not use hand grenades in the assault. The Marine could not explain why the order to not use hand grenades was given. I did not further attempt to explore why this order had been given.

Throughout 19Nov05, other events were taking place in which I had little involvement. While I was focused on engaging the fleeing insurgent to the south, I was aware of, and tracking, four other IED discoveries, two SAP ambushes and an RPG attacking taking place that morning. Because of the attacks, MAJ CARRASCO the Battalion Operations Officer, took command of the CoC and directed Operations and maintained contact with KCO CoC and LT MATHIS who had taken command of the KCO CoC. I recall hearing radio calls for the evacuation of casualties (casevac) both U.S. and civilian. And at one point MAJ CARRASCO spoke with CAPT MCCONNELL, the KCO commanding officer, when he radioed the Battalion CoC requesting the status of his request for a casevac. My direct contact with KCO on 19Nov05 was intermittent and primarily involved KCO providing situation reports (SITREPS) to the Battalion CoC. I do recall hearing MAJ CARRASCO requesting additional information from KCO frequently and expressed frustration over the lack of information he was receiving from KCO. The flow of information from KCO that day was not as good or complete as the Battalion CoC would have liked. I can only describe the mood and attitude of the CoC that early morning as slow and waiting for information from KCO. After 0900 however, as the nature of the citywide attacks became clear, the sense of urgency increased dramatically. All information received by the Battalion CoC was via the KCO CoC. Although the Battalion CoC had the capability to listen to the KCO tactical radio network, the Battalion CoC would have had to change one of its own network radios to another frequency thus compromising its own communications. All communications regarding the developing battle was filtered through the KCO CoC or by CAPT MCCONNELL as he spoke directly with MAJ CARRASCO. This should have been initiated by CAPT MCCONNELL switching his radio to Battalion TAC.

After KCO's initial report of the IED detonation on Route Chestnut, little was heard about anything taking place around Route Chestnut. I believe this is due to the fact that that the squad at Route Chestnut was engaged by insurgents, returning fire, and effectively clearing the area. I do recall hearing that a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) had left Firmbase SPARTA to assist the squad at Route Chestnut but do not know if the squad had requested assistance or if the KCO CoC had decided to they needed to reinforce the squad. By about 0830 it was my impression the area around Route Chestnut was under control and no longer posed an imminent threat to the Marines on Route Chestnut, so I    shifted my focus to other areas of the battle in Haditha. Nothing in the reporting provided by KCO to the Battalion CoC caused any concern to me or other Battalion CoC personnel. The reporting we heard from KCO seemed to indicate the squad on Route Chestnut was properly engaging positively identified insurgents and acting in a manner consistent with our rules of engagement. Beginning about 0930, I began to hear about civilian casualties. I did not initially hear numbers associated with the report of civilian casualties and my recall of the reporting is primarily that of the request for an urgent casevac for one of the Iraqi civilians coupled with a request for a priority casevac for a Marine. It was not until later in the afternoon or early evening that I began to hear numbers associated with the death of civilians. Until then, I heard there were a lot of civilian casualties, but it was not until later that we were actually able to put a number to the "a lot" comment. It was eventually reported by KCO that there were 24 UKIA's pending their positive identification as neutral or enemy. Based on the reporting I had heard from KCO during that day, I associated the deaths of the civilians with one or more being killed by the IED detonation and the remainder them being caught in the crossfire between insurgents, using the civilians as shields, and the Marines. Although I understood Marines had cleared one or two houses It was still my understanding they had done so using proper rules of engagement after taking fire from those houses.

Later in the evening 19Nov05,1 began to put together an assessment of what had occurred that day. Utilizing reporting from SCAN EAGLE and KCO, I put together a Power Point briefing regarding my assessment of the TTP of the insurgents. The assessment was a broad picture of citywide attacks and not solely focused on events surrounding Route Chestnut. I made some assumptions with regards to the number of EKIA and NKIA. Utilizing three reporting criteria, MAJ CARRASCO and I made decisions regarding which individuals killed that day were either EKIA or NKIA. We relied on KCO and the HET, consisting of SGT LAUGHNER and SGT SENTENO at KCO for most of the information used to make our assessments. Our criteria was: I.D. cards or other documentation located on the bodies; profiling (sex, age, clothing);, and proximity of weapons to the bodies. Additionally, information provided by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EOD), and patrol reports provided information on which assessments were made. Based on this criteria and the reporting of KCO and HET, our assessment was eight EKIA and fifteen NKIA on and near Route Chestnut and three EKIA resulting from battles near the COP. At no time was there an attempt to deceive or put forward inaccurate information. My assessment was made using the best information I had available to me at the time. One of the criticisms I had of our deployment was that we were poor at reporting and poor at documenting events. The reporting during this particular day is an example of that. I was not aware of the two Iraqi's engaged by Sgt WOLF'S squad or the Iraqi who was engaged as he ran across the "wadi." I was also not aware of the squad on Route Chestnut engaging any vehicle on Route Chestnut after it was assessed as driving aggressively towards them. After the initial assessment of the EKIA and NKIA, we did not conduct an after-action assessment as to the accuracy of the numbers of Iraqi killed. Based on the information I had access to at the time, I had no reason to believe the information reported was inaccurate, nor do I have reason to believe the information was deliberately falsified to hide any wrongdoing. The Journal Entries (JENs) were prepared by the Battalion and based upon the number of Iraqi's killed known at the time and the chronological events of the day. I understood the JEN regarding the civilians killed by the IED blast and subsequent engagement to mean that an IED blast, coupled with the crossfire by insurgents and return fire from KCO, killed some civilians in the area during the firefight. I also had a conversation with MAJ CARRASCO regarding signals intelligence reporting we received indicating that insurgents had filmed the attack, which was a typical enemy propaganda tool. Due to the number of civilian casualties and the possible propaganda value of the images of the Marines assaulting local houses, MAJ CARRASCO took specific action to inform LTCOL STARLING, the Regimental Operations Officer that the video may be released by insurgents. This also was reflected in his stated desire to provide clear and accurate reporting to Regiment. I recall MAJ CARRASCO observing that if we were inaccurate in our description of the event, and insurgents released a propaganda video, that our inaccuracy would be perceived as dishonesty. I was certain at this time, due to the signals intercept, that such a video existed.

I did not specifically focus on the events that took place on Route Chestnut. The number of civilian deaths seemed large at the time, but the SITREPS forwarded to the Battalion CoC by KCO and LT MATHIS or CAPT MCCONNELL seemed to explain what we were hearing with regards to the death of civilians. I do not believe anyone in the Battalion CoC considered that a violation of the rules of engagement had taken place. Our collective thought at the time when hearing the number of civilian casualties was that someone in the Regimental HQ would initiate an investigation of the deaths of the   civilians. I believe the reason no investigation was initiated by Regimental HQ is the caveat used in the reporting, "Troops in Contact" (TIC). Whenever TIC was utilized in reporting, HQ was much less likely to initiate an investigation because TIC implies an engagement with clear hostile enemy resistance. This is different than when HQ perceived there might have been an unprovoked offensive action, which resulted in the death or injury of an Iraqi citizen, which was sure to initiate an investigation. I did participate in a conversation with MAJ CARRASCO and MAJ GONZALEZ where MAJ GONZALEZ informed us within a week of 19Nov05, he had called the Regimental Executive officer and recommended an investigation of the events surrounding the killing of civilians on 19Nov05. MAJ GONZALEZ reported there seemed to be no interest by the Regimental Executive Officer in initiating an investigation regarding the killing of civilians. I personally did not begin to have concerns regarding the events of 19Nov05 until Jan or Feb06 when the U.S. Army initiated an investigation regarding 19Nov05. I was speaking with MAJ CARRASCO one evening when he mentioned the "Chickens are coming home to roost." I asked him what he meant, he replied they are saying KCO did something wrong on 19Nov05 when the civilians were killed. I understood his statement to mean that the Battalion's aggressive reputation was resulting in added scrutiny. I was still not concerned at this point because I was under the impression what we had been told regarding the actions of Marines on or near Route Chestnut on 19Nov05 was accurate. During one planning meeting to schedule security and movement for the U.S. Army Colonel, LTCOL CHESSANI told us to make sure everyone answered all the questions the Colonel asked and I did not get the impression LTCOL CHESSANI was concerned about the investigation. The only other conversations I had regarding this event was with LT MATHIS and CAPT MCCONNELL. In the weeks following 19Nov05 I debriefed CAPT MCCONNELL and LT MATHIS at the weekly targeting meeting BUB. During the meeting, I briefed the intelligence assessment of what we saw on 19Nov05. I questioned CAPT MCCONNELL and LT MATHIS regarding their impression of insurgent activity and their assessment of TTP. I incorporated their observations into my intelligence assessment of enemy activity.

In late Dec05, we also heard a reporter identified as Tim MCGIRK was scheduled to visit our Battalion. Based on what I was told I believed he was going to visit us to refute the press release that attributed all the deaths on 19Nov05 to the IED blast that killed LCPL TERRAZAS. I and the rest of the Battalion staff had been puzzled by the inaccurate press release but did not formally protest the inaccuracies because we were busy and it did not seem important. I was tasked by COL CHESSANI to develop an unclassified brief for Tim MCGIRK regarding the events of that day. Tim MCGIRK did not show up and I never gave my brief to him. I do not know the reason he did not show up, my assumption at the time was he had found another source of information which gave him the story he wanted to report. I did not give his visit anymore thought until I read the article in a Mar06 issue of Time magazine.

I did not have a personal computer in Iraq that was used or email or to store images or other documents. I used my personal computer for playing DVD's and nothing else. I used the Marine Corps provided NIPRNET at Haditha Dam to email my family and used the Satellite phone to sometimes communicate with my family. I did not use a computer to view, send, or receive photographs pertaining to the incident of 19Nov05. I did not take any videos, photographs or write any correspondence regarding the incidents, which occurred on 19Nov05 in Haditha, Iraq. I became aware photos had been taken by SGT LAUGHNER on 19Nov05. It was not unusual for LT GRAYSON to forward photographs taken during a BDA to me with his report. In this case he did not do so and in late Dec 05, when the Battalion was asking for pictures of the 19 Nov 05 incident  I asked him if any existed. LT GRAYSON informed me he had ordered SGT LAUGHNER to delete the photographs because they did not meet our criteria for having intelligence value. I only received photographs from LT GRAYSON attached to a written report to support the intelligence mission. The fact that he had ordered them deleted did not alarm me, as it was prohibited to maintain pictures of enemy dead or other graphic war images. This was SOP and I routinely enforced this SOP. In Mar 06, after the initiation of the NCIS investigation, I asked LT GRAYSON if he had seen the photographs reportedly taken of the civilians killed on 19Nov05. He explained to me he had and he attempted to describe the content of the photographs the best he could. I realized at that time I had been misinformed as to the seriousness of the allegations regarding the actions of Marines on 19Nov05 and that my assumptions regarding the actions that day of the Marines may have been in error. My personal email account is [withheld]. I used this account to participate in fantasy football and nothing else.

On 19Nov05, I remained at Haditha DAM and did not go to Route Chestnut or go to the IED site where LCPL TERRAZAS was killed. On 19Nov05, I did not see a white vehicle on Route Chestnut, I did not go into homes # 1, # 2, # 3 or # 4, and I did not see any dead bodies in any Iraqi homes that day. I did not see smoke from any burning buildings that day. I did not seize any recovered weapons and do not know if any seized weapons were recovered. No seized weapons were turned into me on 19Nov05. I have been asked if anyone I knew had photographs from 19Nov05, or recorded any other information about this day in personal digital assistants (PDA's), log books, thumb drives, cameras, phones or by any other means. Other than photographs taken by SGT LAUGHTNER, I'm not aware of anyone who had any type of recorded media relating to 19Nov05. I do not have any other information about this incident. I was not involved in the battle damage assessment (BDA) process and I was not debriefed about the incident other than that described above with CAPT MCCONNELL and LT MATHIS. I did author an assessment of the TTP used by the insurgents on 19Nov05, but I did not participate in an on the ground assessment of the battle or damage inflicted by U.S. personnel.

This statement, consisting of this page and 5 other page(s) was typed for me by Edmond B. SWEENEY and Sean P. DEVINNY as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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