IO: Major Erickson, do you want to continue presenting evidence?

TC[Maj Erickson]: Yes, sir. I believe the defense has called Special Agent Cranfill.

CC[Mr. Myers]: We have in fact.

Special Agent Mark R. Cranfill, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, was called as a witness by the prosecution, was sworn, and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Major Erickson:

Q. Special Agent Cranfill, will you please state your full name and spell your last name for the record.

A. Mark R. CRANFILL. The spelling of the last name is C-R-A-N-F-I-L-L.

Q. And you are currently a Special Agent in the Naval Criminal Investigative Service?

A. Yes. I am.

Q. And where are you stationed?

A. I am stationed at NCIS Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

TC[Maj Erickson]: Thank you, sir.

Questions by Mr. Myers:

Q. Special Agent, as I understand it, you were the lead agent in March of 2006 to investigate the Haditha matter on behalf of NCIS in Iraq?

A. Right. I was the on-scene supervisor for the contingent of investigators that went in to Haditha.

Q. And who was on your team, if you recall?

A. Well, there were three agents that were deployed from Iraq and Fallujah ahead of our arrival, because we were coming from different locations throughout the world. But the first three on the scene were Special Agent Marshall, Special Agent Brittingham, and Special Agent McDaniel. They arrived approximately ten days or so before we got there. Then we followed in with myself, Special Agent Mannle, Special Agent Blain, then a few days later, Special Agent Platt; and shortly thereafter, Special Agent Maloney and Special Agent Brady.

Q. Now, we have heard testimony from Special Agent Platt and Special Agent Mannle, so far, and both of them described their duties and said -- Special Agent Plat, in particular, said, well, this is what I was told to do and this is what I did. And Special Agent Manly said pretty much the same thing, that this is what I was told to do, and this is what I did.

Who was in charge of thinking? Was it you? Who was in charge of thinking about the extrapolation of evidence that was accumulated to induce or inductively conclude what should be done next? Was that your job, to think?

A. Well, all our jobs were to think, and to -- I mean, it was a collaborative team in which everyone had talents and skills, and you know, through that process, we tried to identify whatever information or relevant information we could obtain to complete a comprehensive and impartial investigation.

Q. So when a Special Agent says that, under oath, that they simply did what they were told to do, that really isn't the whole story. They had an obligation to extrapolate what they learned in the other areas or to inform you that they thought further investigation in an area was appropriate. Isn't that certainly true?

A. I am a little unclear with the question. I was a supervisor. I directed certain things. I monitored to make sure that, you know, and I tried to contribute, and we all tried to contribute, but everybody was always thinking. I mean, I am not sure if I--

Q. No, I think that that is fine. I just wanted to raise the question with whether they had responsibilities beyond the identified responsibilities that they were given, for example: Special Agent Platt was given the responsibility of interviewing two people. And what you are telling me is that if he derived something from that interview that he thought was important, he had a responsibility to tell you about it?

A. Yeah, sure. The idea is to share the information that we came across in a group setting so that we could all build cooperative knowledge and a common understanding of the events that occurred, so that we could all do our job in a better way.

So we tried to facilitate each other, and tried to support each other, for example: I did an interview because there weren't enough people to do it. And rather than just directing people, I pitched in and went out and did an interview, which was not a major interview, but it was --

Q. When you went into the town of Haditha, I think you went in on the 29 March?

A. I went in three times.

Q. Could you describe for the IO the operation circumstance you faced in Haditha, in terms of your ability to derive the kinds of evidence that you would normally derive in any crime setting?

A. Well, I had three missions in Haditha. So which one would you -- with different objectives. So which one would you want me to speak to?

Q. Well, let's focus on March 29, okay?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall that day?

A. I do, yes.

Q. Let's focus on that. What was the operational circumstance that you faced in Haditha which may have been an impact on your evidence gathering capabilities?

A. Well, Haditha was in a -- what I would consider a quasi-pacified area. There were combat operations going on throughout the area. So security was a significant factor in our considerations.

When we evaluated how we would do things, we were always mindful of the fact that we had a security team that was providing for our perimeter, and therefore, those individuals would be exposed. So I personally paid a great deal of attention to the fact that this was a regrettable and tragic incident, but I did not want to see any more loss of life through the investigation of the matter.

So you know, for example, a Sergeant who was leading a mission. If he told me something, I would factor that in, regarding security. So those were very paramount, as much, or as important as the investigative aspects, as well.

Q. Were those consideration such that your professional judgment -- you had to compromise the manner in which you derived evidence?

A. No. You had to consider, I mean, there were challenges. In any criminal investigation, there are challenges with environment, for example, if there is weather. In this case, there is security. And you deal with those challenges in investigations as you would within an urban environment within the United States. So these are all factors that are considered.

Q. Understood. Let me give you a hypothetical, and I'm asking you to respond. A special agent in Haditha on 29 March, under the circumstances you described, wishes to interview seven or eight people. All of whom supposedly have independent recollection of an event. That special agent assembles all of the people in one room and takes a collective statement.

Given the operational circumstances that you described, would that have been an appropriate course, then and there, under the circumstances?

A. Well, I am assuming you are talking about house four on the 29th, and I was there. And considering the security situation there, I concurred and I made that decision that it was to the best interest of the safety of those on scene not to try to move everyone to other locations.

So yes. In that case, we needed to do -- they were there. We had an opportunity to interview them, and it was a consideration that I had to take in, too.

Q. But you were, were you not, in election with bounds of potential for compromise of the investigation over and against the security.

A. You would agree with me, would you not, a person with your experience that it is not SOP to collectively interview six or seven people, all of whom supposedly have independent recollections?

Q. Well, you have to remember that SOP is for an investigation that maybe occurred in the United States. We are dealing with a tactical environment. We are making a new SOP. You have to respond to new circumstances and try to collect information with the circumstances you are given. You don't really have the ability to craft or shape your circumstances. You have to respond as a professional, and in the best way you are trained. That is why you think -- that is why you use your experience to try to do the very best you can. And this is not usual in any situation.

A. And I appreciate that. And this isn't meant to be an attempt to disarray the NCIS procedures. I am merely trying to get at this point: In truth, putting a group of people in a room, all of whom supposedly have independent recollection, and allowing them to have a leader, so to speak, and allowing them to hear the story, would you not agree that that forms some element of compromise of the integrity of the investigation?

Q. I don't agree with that.

A. You don't? It's difficult to imagine why you don't. What possible rationale could you provide to me or this IO which would suggest that collectively putting seven people in a room, all of whom who are supposed to have independent recollections, and allowing them all to hear the same story wouldn't compromise the ultimate result?

A. I am not saying it did or did not. I am telling you the facts that occurred. It is for the IO to decide the veracity of the information. We had a set of circumstances that we had to deal with. The choices were limited. In the end, some choices were. Do we try to collect information or lose it?

You don't always get a chance to interview people in Iraq. They leave, they move. It's not like they have cell phones. So sometimes when you have an opportunity to collect information, it serves a greater purpose to get it when you can, versus ignore it and try to have a perfect situation. It's for others to decide whether that situation compromises or does not. I'm not in a position to tell you that, sir. So that would be my --

Q. Well, you are a veteran NCIS agent, are you not?

A. Twenty years, twenty-five years.

Q. And I respect that. But the idea that anybody else in this room has better expertise to determine whether or not that compromises an investigation is hard to imagine. I don't. And with all do respect to the IO, I doubt that he does.

You are the guy who is the subject matter expert on how to do investigations. And you are telling me that you are going to leave it up to somebody else to decide whether that compromises?

A. Well, I made a decision, and my decision -- and I have explained why it was done. And I leave it up to others to interpret that. But it is a decision that I would make today, and I mean, I could tell you that in every investigation I have ever been in, I could always say that I wish there was other circumstances, and maybe the outcome would have been different.

But in this set of circumstances, and the realities on the ground in Haditha, when I was there, I felt I balanced the reality of safety of others to the information collection mandate and the investigative mission that we were on. Again, that is for others to decide how appropriate that decision is. But I stand by it, and those are my reasons.

Q. These individuals in that room on that day that were being interviewed by Special Agent Mannle, were they represented by a lawyer? Not in that room. I am asking you, in general, if they were represented by a lawyer?

A. No, there was no attorney present.

Q. I understand that. But to your knowledge, did they have an attorney representing them in an attempt to gain payments from the United States, to your knowledge? If you didn't know, you didn't know.

A. As a matter of fact, they told me they were not interested in payment.

Q. They did end up with payments, didn't they?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't know that?

A. I don't know.

Q. And did you know that the attorney who was involved with them was also involved with house one and house two?

IO: Well, just so you know, those are attorney involved, so that question is kind of misleading.

CC[Mr. Myers]: Then I will drop that.

Questions by Mr. Myers continued:

Q. With respect to that day of March 29, 2006, were you with the forensic team that was doing the physical forensic work in the bedroom of house four?

A. I assisted them, yes, I did.

Q. Were you aware that an AK-47 magazine was found on the roof of that building?

A. It's been a year. I believe I recall when I approached, the Marines that was part of our security detachment approached the house and did a clearing. They secured the house and the area for us to enter as we stood by outside.

So I don't know -- I believe when I was moving into the house, I glanced down to the left of the front entryway, and I believe I saw a magazine sitting outside of the house. To be honest with you, I don't think I saw it when I left and we were entering the house kind of in a orderly fashion. So I was not aware of where it was found, and I do have a recollection of seeing it.

Q. When the Marines cleared that house, did they clear that house by having their weapons at their side, or did they enter the house in a combat posture?

A. There was a wall in front of the house. We were positioned outside that wall behind cover because it was an open street. And so I did not have actual visual on the Marines and how they approached the house. But I don't remember it being a dynamic kind of entry, or a tactical kind of situation. But I know that their purpose was of a security function.

Q. Did there come a point in time when you learned that any person had maintained an AK-47 in house four?

A. Could you repeat the question?

Q. Did there come a time, on that day or shortly thereafter, when you learned that a person associated with houses three and four kept a weapon, an AK-47 in house four?

A. Houses three and four? I mean, I -- there was a lot of information that was developed through the course of the investigation. I had heard through different sources, and to be honest with you, I don't have the reports in front of me, but that there were statements made that there was weapons at different times in the house – in that residence. So while I was aware of it, you know, there was different circumstances explaining that, you know, those weapons. So there was a variety of scenarios.

Q. Did you, based upon your own observations, come to learn that one of the individuals who was shot worked on the Jordanian border?

A. Through my own information gathered, I was not aware of that.

Q. Were you aware that one individual shot was meant to be traffic cop?

A. I had heard that, yes.

Q. Did it seem important to you to determine whether or not these individuals had ties to the insurgents?

A. Well, through the investigation, information was developed that would have spoken to the motives, or how the circumstances occurred. If, in fact, information was developed that pointed to an insurgency tie, then it is something that we would have followed up on.

Q. Well, let me give you some ideas of what I am talking about in the evidence that the IO has before him indicated.

That one of the brothers worked on the Jordanian border;

Two, that there was a suitcase which a Marine said contained Jordanian passports;

Three, the brothers worked in capacities within the City of Haditha that gave them access to, at least the infrastructure of the city in terms of certain government buildings;

Four, Haditha, we now learned, was a place of increased violence, and by that I mean multiple IED's and multiple interactions with Marines.

Given all of those things, wouldn't a full examination of the backgrounds of these four dead individuals, and also of the fifth brother, had been helpful in determining whether or not they could have engaged in the conduct that the accused in this case has described?

A. Well, in that regard, there were -- I will address it like this. You mentioned the Jordanian passports. Special Agent Blain -- I directed Special Agent Blain to establish liaison with the HET team, the intelligence element assigned to 3d Battalion. And when we heard about this, we investigated, ran it down, and I asked him to go in liaison and speak to them about these passports. He came back to me and told me that there was no association made with those passports and house four, house one, house two, or the individuals that were associated with the taxicab. Therefore, there were many other units doing sweeps in that area and talking to a lot of individuals. So then I asked them if they still existed and if we would obtain them.

They did not. They were not available. I don't know what happened. I knew that and I felt that later on. What I wanted to make sure of, once the Battalion was leaving, I wanted to see if there was any documentation evidence that we could obtain and then later we could look at and examine. At that time, there was not. We asked the question, and the information that came back to me was negative. So the Jordanian passport issue, there was no associated made to me to house four.

Q. You couldn't find the AK-47's either. Right?

A. Nor could anyone else. The Marines couldn't find them. We asked for them and we looked for them and there were records that were examined. We were told that they weren't cataloging weapons that were seized in the field, and they would redistribute them out to Iraqi forces. So that was a piece that we heard, or it was reported to us, and we followed up on that, as well.

Q. So what you are telling me, I think -- correct me if I am wrong, that all of the evidence that could have been exculpatory, for whatever reason, by the time you got to the point of investigating this matter, didn't exist anymore?

A. Could you be specific on what evidence you are speaking about?

Q. Sure. I am talking about the Jordanian passport and the AK-47's?

A. I addressed that.

Q. And would you agree that sort of evidence could have been exculpatory?

A. Well, if evidence was collected, the value of that evidence would be determined in the investigation those who would evaluate the facts. We had heard about that and we followed up on the lead, and it wasn't available.

So whether or not it was exculpatory or not, its no there. It wasn't found, and it wasn't associated with that. So the lack of it, or the presence of it is for others to decide what that is significance, in a sense of exculpatoriness.

For me, if I found -- if I was aware of evidence or information, we would try to obtain it to be complete and thorough and impartial in our investigation. But in this case, it didn't pan out as a lead.

Q. Certainly, if you had found that the AK-47's had been taken out of house four and had been properly cataloged and identified and retained as evidence, you then could have undergone -- you then could have undergone a forensic examination to see if they were discharged because fingerprints were on them, so on and so forth?

A. That's a hypothetical, sir. I mean, if there were weapons available, we would have seized them if we could have. There would be nothing that would have prevented us from doing that if they were available, and we would have tried. In this case, they were not there so it is really difficult to comment on a hypothetical.

Q. It is difficult, but possible if you wanted to?

IO: That is not a question. Let's just stick to questions.

CC[Mr. Myers]: Thank you.

Questions by Mr. Myers continued:

Q. The last thing that I would like to deal with is we have a myriad or statements from various people, and they are all very neatly typed and everybody has their little initials in front and behind each and every paragraph. And of course, it looks like, and what we are told, is they have been typed by an NCIS agent.

Now, this is not the first time you have been asked this question, but I want it on the record here. Why, sir, do you not audio or video tape your interrogations of these young Marines?

A. Can you -- I mean, there was a lot of interviews over along period of time. Each interview has it's own set of circumstances. If you have a specific interview that you want to ask me about, I can comment.

Q. Let me ask you this way: Can you point to any interview that was conducted by NCIS where audio or video tape was utilized in the conducting that interview?

A. My involvement in the investigation was from the conception to September 13. I am not aware -- there were other interviews that were recorded or where audio or audiovisual equipment was used. It is our policy that it is optional, and each case is evaluated on it's own circumstances.

Q. Well, what are the two options, don't and don't?

A. Well, options are applied to each individual circumstance. So those options would be based on the circumstance that you are faced with.

Q. What possible, logical reason in 2007 would there be for not audio taping or video taping an interview so that we could see which questions you asked, how the young person responded? Give me one rational reason why you wouldn't do that?

IO: Wait. I will allow you ask questions that pertain to statements that are taken under the circumstances here, but NCIS policy is not really going to help me in my investigation.

I understand where you want to go with it. It's not going to help me make my decision.

CC[Mr. Myers]: I understand. I wanted it on the record, and I am done now.

IO: I am not interested in creating some other record on this investigation.

CC[Mr. Myers]: I understand.

IO: All right.

CC[Mr. Myers]: Well, thank you very much.

IO: Major Erickson, any follow up?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by Major Erickson:

Q. Special Agent Cranfill, before you went out to house four in March of 2006 to do the death scene examination, did you send an advanced team out there to let the occupants of house four know that you were coming?

A. We did not.

Q. Did you let the occupants know that you were going to interview them?

A. We did not.

Q. Have you ever met the occupants of that house before that day?

A. I did not.

Q. Now, you hesitated because there was another time that you did interview some Haditha residents. Is that true?

A. I had a previous mission at Haditha Hospital regarding summations, but they -- a representative from house four did show up -- was not at that meeting, they attended subsequently.

Q. Okay, thank you. Now, when you got there, do you remember the brother of the four male victims whose name was Yused, was he present?

A. He was.

Q. And he was in the house when you got in the house?

A. I believe so.

Q. Now, when Marines cleared the house for your crime scene examination, there was testimony earlier in the hearing that there was screams heard coming from the house. Do you remember that at all?

A. I believe I would have remembered that if I heard screams.

Q. But as you sit here today, you don't really remember that?

A. From where I was, there was no scream.

Q. Did you hear any gunshots?

A. I did not hear gunshots during the clearing.

Q. And you didn't see whether or not the Marine confiscated anything out of that house?

A. I never saw a Marine holding anything that looked -- other than their own gear that they came with.

Q. Now, during your direct examination you were asked some questions about whether or not you followed up on certain leads. Some leads with regard to Jordanian passports. I think you've answered that sufficiently for the IO.

Let's go back to this AK-47 issue. By the time you got back to the Dam after Nathan and Mannle completed your interview with the Iraqi occupants of house four, were you aware of two different versions of events that occurred in house four on November 19th?

A. Actually, it was late. It became dark and it had been a long day. So when we returned, we had security positions within the convoy. We didn't speak about what occurred. Once we got in -- we got in and we went about the task of, you know, gearing down. And the team -- I cut them free. And then later on there was a discussion about what went on.

Now, I was in and out of the room during the interviews, so I heard bits and pieces of it. But in the context of, you know, the complete interview, I had only heard bits and pieces.

Q. Is it fair to say that you were aware that there was AK-47's involved in house four, whether they were in there when the Marines entered, or whether they weren't?

A. Yeah. In a previous statement by Marines, there was an account that stated that there were weapons in house four, yes.

Q. And you said that you did ask the Marines of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines for their weapons log? Well, you didn't say that, but did you ask for the weapons log?

A. Well, there are two weapons logs. There's weapons logs for the Marine TOB weapons, and then there was – we asked for certain documentation that would support the seizure of weapons in the field from Iraqi citizens specifically relating to house four and the events in question. So we did ask for that and there were no records.

Q. But you did get a record? Did you, at least, confiscate anything that had to do with confiscated weapons?

A. We did take weapons from the Marines. All of the weapons that we identified that were assigned to them through their serial numbers. And I believe we also took some barrels that were interchangeable from a 240Gulf. But yes, when we identified any weapons associated with the scene, we seized them, if we could -- if it was available.

Q. And did you have any of the agents, while they were there, look at the room where confiscated weapons were kept? Do you remember anything like that?

A. I did send Special Agent Blain to make inquiries in that regard. I'm not sure on if he went to a room, or if he spoke to the HET team. But he came back to me and said that the weapons were taken, and they were distributed. And as far as I am aware of, there is no record of anyAK-47's seized in relation to house four.

Q. Now, you said earlier that you had been an NCIS agent for 25 years?

A. I have been an NCIS agent for 19 years and 9 months. I was a police officer prior to that.

Q. With regards to law enforcement, how long have you been in the field?

A. Under 25 years.

Q. And how many testing examinations have you participated in?

A. Fifty. Probably not more than a hundred. Somewhere between fifty and a hundred.

Q. How many of those fifty to a hundred were with NCIS? Just estimate, that's fine. We're just looking for an answer.

A. I'm unsure. Maybe half. Well, no --

Q. Was it more than 20?

A. More than 20.

Q. Fair enough. Now, how about with regards to NCIS? How many of those were in a tactical environment?

A. In a previous deployment to Iraq, I investigated two incidents in Southern Iraq where it was Iraqi on Iraqi incidents of killings, related to my duties as Counterintelligence Chief.

Q. Now, based on what you knew from this death scene examination, can you give us an idea of how you believed, or how -- put it in perspective for us. How complete was this death scene investigation based on all of the factors that went into this death scene investigation, compared to the other ones that you conducted with NCIS? Give us an idea.

A. First of all, we had a team of forensic consultants who were there. They were brought in, and they accompanied us to that scene. I assisted, but I did not conduct that death scene investigation, specifically.

So I have done investigations, but I have never done an investigation that was as thorough as that, nor am I a forensic consultant with the kind of training and expertise that Special Agent Brady and Maloney had. So it exceeded many death scenes that I have been at. But I don't illustrate myself as a forensic specialist on a crime scene.

Q. And that's fair. We will have Special Agent Maloney in tomorrow, so we will go into it in more detail with him tomorrow. Now, you said that you were prior Counterintelligence?

A. I was the Chief of Counterintelligence in Southern Iraq, assigned to the Coalition of Physical Authority in Iraq. That was in 2003 and 2004.

Q. So you understand the importance of intelligence gathering?

A. I would like to think that I have a pretty good grasp with that, yes.

Q. Now, Special Agent Cranfill, in Iraq when you were talking about the four brothers and the victims in the house, what measures did you take to determine whether or not they had ties to the insurgents?

A. Well, we did ask the question of the HET team who, frankly, on the ground, they were the most knowledgeable of insurgent operations and should have been.

Q. And what reply did you get back from HET?

A. The HET team did not provide us any information that associated the individuals from house four, or any other individuals that were identified as deceased in that event, to insurgency activity in the area.

Q. And did you just leave it at that?

A. I am not aware of all aspects. This question came up with a great deal of investigative activity on this case. I am not sure if there was additional follow upon that, but I know at that time, we were looking and trying to identify anything that we could at the scene.

If we left, we would lose, and at that time, there was nothing.

Later on, I am not sure if that was asked or followed upon with others. I know there was follow up with HET team members. I know that some of their data bases were looked at. So I am not sure what, if anything, there was additional investigation developed. I am not aware of it myself.

TC[Maj Erickson]: That is all we got, sir.

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Questions by the investigating officer:

Q. Special Agent Cranfill, when you went to the home of house four, you said you didn't inform the occupant that you were coming there and it surprised them by not informing them ahead of time?

A. That is correct.

Q. What was your purpose for going to house four on the 29th of May?

A. It had been identified through the investigation that it was a site where individuals had been -- it was a death scene associated with the investigation.

Q. And so your purpose was to catalog and see if there was any remaining evidence from the death scene?

A. Well, yes, that was our primary mission. But we were there to collect and gather any investigation that we could. So if the opportunity to conduct interviews would have presented itself, and it did, we were going to follow up on that. So not knowing exactly what we were going to encounter, we took the entire team. We just didn't take our forensic people, and we wanted to go there to further our investigation.

Q. So did you conduct rehearsals on what you would do when you got to house four?

A. We did. Before we arrived, there was some specialized equipment that many of us had never worked with at the forensic consultants half. So being aware that we had only, you know -- we really needed to try to do this in an expeditious and methodical fashion. We did talk about, you know, what we wanted to accomplish, and for example, everyone had a job assigned. Mine was to assist in making measurements of the entire structure. And, you know, there was people assigned to collect evidence, and that sort of thing. So yes. We talked about the information we knew up to that point.

The following day we got together with the equipment. There were people that were assigned to carry certain pieces of equipment and avail it at the scene. So, yes.

Q. You say the investigation was available at the time. Did you read the previous statements that were collected from Marines who were at the home on 19 November?

A. We had.

Q. So you had an idea of, at least, that version of facts that were relayed by the Marines?

A. Yes. There were interviews conducted, and those were discussed. For example, that is how we were able to know that house four was relevant.

Q. Was there any discussion about bringing one of those Marines with you to point out the various aspects with regards to information -- with regards as it is relating to the house?

A. No.

Q. Did you contemplate bringing video equipment in order to video tape the rooms, or walk through the building, so that you could -- someone else -- the full scale – I know you planned on taking pictures, but was there any discussion on maybe we should video tape down the hall and into the room as was described in the statements?

A. Sir, I don't recall.

Q. I am just asking.

A. I have a recollection of a discussion, but I don't remember the specifics. I mean, I know that we took photographs, and I would only have to speculate because my memory on that particular issue is somewhat vague.

Q. And I know it sounds like we are all second guessing you here, but was March 29 chosen by NCIS or was it chosen by the military as the date to go to the scene of the investigation?

A. Well, we chose date that we wanted. Once that date was chosen, we then did coordination with Command to see if they could support that with a security mission, and we also talked to Intel and HET. Whenever I ran a mission, because I was also responsible for the safety of my people, I wanted to make sure that there was known threats in the city before we ran a mission that would provide undue rest [?] to the Marines on my team.

Q. So March 29th presented itself, but if you wanted to get additional equipment or additional personal, you weren't required to go there March 29. I am saying that was the date chosen by NCIS in coordination with the military?

A. It was a date that we wanted to go. It met with our needs and we are fortunate that the Marines were able to accommodate us.

Q. So if one of your agents asked for additional equipment or wanted a recording device before March 29, you could have chosen a different day and gotten the equipment in country?

A. Well, sure. I had the authority to do that.

Q. This -- it has been described in the group interview, or this interview, where there was Yusof and some of the ladies present. You said you were part of the decision to say, okay, we're conducting the matter. And you described security concerns and time frame concerns.

My question to you is -- and we've been told through some of the testimony that the nature of the society in Iraq is the male, pretty much, dominates or controls access to the females of the family. That is why they are present. Did Yusof, require you to interview all of them at one time, or was it allowed for you to take them into a separate room and interview them separate?

A. If I may, your question is did he make requirements on us?

Q. Right. Essentially, did he?

A. He did not. I will say this: Some women were apprehensive to speak with us. They were afraid, you know, and some were less. The whole family was there. We didn't center on him, but the family was there, anyways. Also too, for security reasons, it is desirable to have everybody in one room. So that was why everyone was in that room, and that is one of the reasons why the interviews occurred in that location.

Q. How many rooms were in house four?

A. I believe eight.

Q. So you didn't want them spreading throughout the building, because you didn't have Marines watching where they were going?

A. That is partially, but also, too, we were doing, simultaneously -- in the same house, we had a death scene investigation, and obviously, there had been people there for a long period of time. We had taken photographs. We didn't want them in the photographs. We were processing different rooms. So we were trying to provide the death scene investigators the latitude of free movement throughout the house. So it was security. It was practicality to facilitate the investigation. So it had a dual purpose.

Q. Now, as part of your task goes, when you were in the supervisor role, you mentioned there was a question about Special Agent Platt going back to do additional interviews on two women who were allegedly witnesses. Do you remember putting them on the task?

A. I was back at Headquarters. I remember that task being levied.

Q. So when did you leave?

A. I left -- we all left Haditha on the 31st of March. Mr. Platt, though, had already been designated for a deployment to Fallujah, and so he and I went on to Fallujah where then he rolled into his unrelated assignment to Haditha. But then later on when we had followed up, because he was familiar with it, we tapped him to do follow-up interviews.

Q. So in April, you weren't the supervising agent anymore?

A. I was a supervisor. In April, well, the first part of April, yes. But as this investigation became a very large investigation spanning worldwide in some ways, we formed -- a task force was formed. It was the Iraq Criminal Investigative Task Force.

At that point, the Deputy Assistant Director of Investigations came in, and I was subordinate to him. I continued to function until September 13 as one of the supervisors affiliated with the investigation.

Q. Were you aware that Special Agent Platt's interview with those two witnesses was cut short by small arms fire?

A. Later, I did hear about that.

Q. Was there an additional task put out to finish those interviews or have Special Agent Plat return to complete those interviews?

A. Some of those taskers I was not affiliated with. That was a methodical story that I heard, because one of our guys was placed in harms way so I heard about it. But the effect of that on future taskers was never associated to me as being -- I wasn't privy to all conversations regarding that issue.

Q. I was just asking for inquiry.

A. Sure. I understand.

Q. In fact, when you went to house four on March 29, did you also go to other homes in a related investigation or was it focused simply on house four?

A. Because there were multiple scenes, this was a – at that time, I think it was like 1224 on the 29th, we entered -- that was our first house.

I think at 1438, the forensic team stated that they either -- I believe they said they were done, or they got what they needed. But I know that -- I was kind of over seeing the entire, you know -- just kind of going along and checking in with the Marines and making sure that, externally, nothing had changed, as far as security, and helping out when I could. They then left.

Special Agent Mannle continued with her interviews. The forensic teamed moved out of that location with a contingent of Marines to examine the houses known in the investigation as house one and two. Around 1530, I believe it was, Special Agent Mannle concluded her interviews, and I stayed there with her because there were only two NCIS Agents there. So I stayed there with her, and then there was an explosion that was heard off in the distance, and I could sense that the Marines were getting apprehensive.

So we sent a runner over to see what the progress was of the crime scene at houses one and two, and they came back that they were completed and that we could depart.

Q. But from your interpretation, you were able to accomplish what you needed to accomplish.

A. Sir, I believe that forensically -- I believe, yes. They told me that they had accomplished what they wanted to accomplish, so it is my understanding that we did.

Q. So from your perspective, you went to go look at other homes?

A. Actually, house four, we had a lot of time, yes. I think they had as much time as they needed. No one ever told me that they were, you know -- that they were cut short of what they needed to accomplish for the objective of house four.

Q. I just heard testimony about this explosion. I just wanted to make sure that explosion didn't cause your investigation to get cut short.

A. It was, maybe, two or three miles away. We don't know if it was Marines. We don't know what it was, but we had also been there for a while. The longer you're at one place, the more, you know, the word can get out in the town. So you like to get things done, but you don't want to be there any longer than you have to be.

Q. Is that because in your experience and what you were told, the Haditha area was a volatile area for Americans to be found there?

A. I had gotten a security brief going in. Haditha was characterized as a particularly active area throughout the province.

Q. Haditha is an active place, and is it likely to be attacked if you stay in one place to long?

A. The threat was significant for insurgent activity within that Al Anbar province at the time.

IO: Counsel, any follow up?

CC[Mr. Myers]: Nothing further, Thank you.

TC[Maj Erickson]: No, sir.

IO: Now, Special Agent Cranfill, are you currently going to be in any status, or taken out of the country which would make you unavailable if you were to be required to testify in the proceeding?

WIT[SA Cranfill]: I am not aware of any at this time pending, sir.

IO: Thank you for your testimony. You are free to watch the rest of these proceedings, or you can exit if you desire.

WIT[SA Cranfill]: Thank you, sir.

The witness was excused from the witness stand.

IO: Counsel, we will take a quick recess. I want to read through those statements I received this morning.

The Article 32 investigation recessed at 0920, 13 June 2007.

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