Special Agent Mannle, NCIS, was called via telephone as a witness by the prosecution, was sworn, and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Major Erickson:

Q. Good afternoon, Special Agent Mannle, your time; and good morning for us. Where are you currently at?

A. I am currently at the Pentagon in an office of one of my peers. She is the financial planner here.

Q. Are you by yourself?

A. I am by myself.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, do you have your agent notes and IAs that you were involved in?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, what is your current billet and assignment?

A. I currently work at the NCIS Headquarters at Washington D.C. Navy Yard. I am a desk officer and cold case unit as of March of this year.

Q. How long have you been a special agent?

A. For five years.

Q. And have you been with cold case the entire five years?

A. No. I just moved there in March. Prior to that, I was on the special interests desk where we do high viz cases out of Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as Gitmo, and the death investigations desk as well where that just covers the quality assurance review of all of our death cases in the field.

Q. How long were you with the Special Interests Force?

A. Almost three years, up until -- I got there approximately three years ago this month. June, 3 years ago and up until March when I moved over to cold case.

Q. Before that, what were you doing?

A. I was in Okinawa. I was an agent with the NCISRA out in Okinawa.

Q. Say that again. The NCISRA?

A. The NCISRA, the NCIS Resident Agency office on the island of Okinawa where I was an agent in the Gen Crim Department.

Q. General Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That is correct.

Q. Before that, is that where you first became a special agent with NCIS?

A. Correct. That was my first assignment.

Q. What training did you have to go through to become an NCIS agent?

A. I attended the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia for approximately four months.

Q. Before that, what did you do?

A. Before that, I practiced law. I was a lawyer in Hawaii.

Q. How long did you practice law?

A. About three years.

Q. Okay. I guess that is enough foundation for now. Can you tell the IO when and how you became involved in this Haditha investigation.

A. About the second week of March 2006, some of the facts of this case came to my attention while I was on the special interests desk.

Q. I am going to stop you right there. You say some of the facts came to your attention. What form did those facts come in?

A. We received portions of an AR15-6 United States Army Investigation. At that point, we had learned as an agency that we had been requested to become involved and open an investigation. So that reached my desk within a day or two of us actually opening the investigation and sending agents on ground in Iraq.

Q. And then what happened after you reviewed the investigation and were told you were going to Iraq? How did that all come about?

A. Basically, my direct supervisor, which is Mr. Cranfield, who ended up being our team leader for those of us that flew out to Iraq, approached me and advised that he wanted me to be a member of the team going into Iraq. So I basically had two-days notice. From there, we left D.C. and headed to Iraq.

Q. So this team that was assembled, it was yourself and Special Agent Cranfield. Special Agent Cranfield was the lead --

A. Yes, sir.

Q. -- at this point?

A. Yes, he was the lead.

Q. And then we have yourself. Who else was part of that team?

A. We were met in Germany by Special Agent Tony Blane out of Camp Pendleton. He was chosen as the agent to represent the field office where we knew the Marines would be returning to. We were also met by Special Agent Mark Platt, also out of the D.C. area. Eventually the two forensic consultants also met us. And that would be Special Agent Mike Maloney and Special Agent Tom Brady.

Q. Okay. And you met there in Germany, and then you went to Iraq from there?

A. From there to Kuwait and from Kuwait into Iraq. Correct.

Q. Once you got into Iraq, you went ahead to Haditha. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, once you are at Haditha, where were you, I guess, headquartered? Where did you run your operation out of?

A. Straight out of the Haditha dam. The main office was -- I think it was on the second deck. I was on the third deck where I stayed.

Q. Was there any particular reason you were on the third deck?

A. I am the only female there on the team, but I was also the only female among about 1,800 Marines. So they kind of had to set up a separate room for me.

Q. Okay. What was that room like? Can you describe it for us a little bit.

A. Sure. It was pretty austere. It was the equivalent of any other barracks room that they had set up for the Marines there. It is just that I was the only one who occupied the room. There were several bunks that were not used with me in it. But there were approximately four to five bunks in there. They had taken the top bunks off. So there was just single beds for the most part in that room. And there was a balcony off of my room looking over the Haditha dam. That is really about it. I think I had a chair in there as well.

Q. Now, you said this team, you all got to Haditha and operated inside the Haditha dam second and third deck. Special Agent Cranfield is still lead at this time?

A. Yes. Upon his arrival, he was the most senior agent onsite; and he was the lead. My understanding is when -- before we arrived, the agents that had arrived earlier than us on ground -- that consisted of three other agents, Special Agent Bradenham, McDaniel, and Marshall. Of the three of them, I believe Agent Bradenham took the lead until Mr. Cranfield arrived.

Q. Those three agents that were already on the ground, do you know how long they were in Haditha before you got there?

A. I believe they arrived the day after we were asked -- "we" being NCIS as an agency -- to investigate the issue at hand. I think they went in on the 12th or 13th. I think they arrived on the 13th.

Q. That is March 2006?

A. Yes.

Q. And were they piping you information, or are you aware of information they were piping to you or letting you know of anything they've done before you actually got into Haditha?

A. Right. One of the first things we did upon arrival, they met us right off the bird and immediately went into a briefing with them where they went through everything that they had gathered at that point. The majority of what they had gathered at that point was interviewing the Marines that were involved in the shooting.

Q. Before you got to the dam, had they been giving you any information?

A. I had not received it directly. I know some of the seniors had. And I was getting information from them. But there wasn't any report. What we basically had on hand were excerpts from the 15-6.

Q. Which is the Colonel Watt Army investigation?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. But other than that, Special Agent Bradenham wasn't sending reports back to the states before you got there?

A. Right. No. They were busy working the case. That environment there, it wasn't very good conductivity. In fact, not until we got there did we have one computer that was working well enough for us to communicate back to our headquarters via e-mail.

Q. How about phone calls? Before you went over there, did you have a big meeting back here in D.C. with the team to discuss the facts of the case?

A. Well, the only two that were in D.C. would have been Mr. Cranfield and myself. What we knew, again, was what we had from the 15-6 paperwork. And we did not have all of it. We had a very minimal portion of it.

Q. I think I wore that out. I will move on. What did you do to prepare before you went into Haditha? Was there any preparation that your team, as a team, put together to do this investigation?

A. For some of us, we were meeting for the very first time. I had not met Agent Blane before or McDaniel or Marshall. We hadn't done anything as a team. I think individually we had a variety of experiences that would have prepped us for going into Iraq. I had recently attended some training at the FLETC, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. It is a portion of what our folks go through when they go to Iraq. Having been on the death desk and seeing the cases out of Iraq, I certainly knew what we needed to do in terms of some of the things we would be facing in Iraq conducting a death scene investigation. But as a team, no, not until we were actually in Haditha did we do some prep work as a team before we convoyed out to the city.

Q. So that prep work as a team that you did once you got into Haditha, can you tell the IO what that consisted of.

A. Sure. Basically, once we had everyone on site in Haditha, it became evident that with the briefings we received from the Marines on ground, we had a very small window of opportunity to conduct our investigative actions out in the City of Haditha. They explained to us -- "they" being the Marines -- that we had approximately an hour before the insurgents in the area could muster some form of response to our presence, that response likely being any kind of attack. So we had to -- knowing that is what we would be facing, we practiced some of the things we would do before going into Haditha. We knew from the get go we wanted to go out to the death scene and conduct death scene examinations of the three sites that we intended to go to.

Q. I am going to stop you there real quick. The three sites that you intended to go to, what were those three sites?

A. We refer to it in the investigation as houses one, two, and four. Four is actually almost connected to three. But those are the three sites.

Q. You said you did rehearsals for each of these three sites. Kind of walk us through a rehearsal for the house for death scene examination.

A. First, our two senior consultants, Maloney and Brady gave us a class, if you will, on what they meant by a tactical death scene examination. It is very unlike what we learned. Normally, in a death scene examination, you would spend hours and hours and you would hold off anybody from coming into a death scene examination for as many days as possible, if you could. That was not what we had at hand. They said to operate under the conditions we were operating under, we had to practice. And they gave us some equipment they had been using, show us how to use it, and explain how it is going to expedite the process. They would have to do a lot of leg work on the back end. But initially, they showed us how to go through a room. And we practiced that in the bottom floor of the Haditha dam, the approach to the room going in, who was going to measure, who was going to stand at what wall, and what we would need to do to make the most of the short amount of time we had.

Q. Did it seem like one of the forensic consultants kind of took lead on this particular phase of your team's efforts?

A. I would say it would be Agent Maloney that was really leading us through. They both actually taught us what to do. But I would say Agent Maloney was probably the one taking more of the lead.

Q. What was your role in the actual death scene examination?

A. The intended role was I was going to be a team member in assisting with the measurement and documenting as a note taker on everything we were doing. However, we planned for the contingency, if we were met by any potential witnesses, especially if there was going to be any females among the potential witnesses, that I would attempt to conduct an interview with them. So they knew they might lose me. But the information we had was that we were likely to just get to homes that were empty, as they were in one and two. So initially, I was supposed to be an equal part of the death scene examination.

Q. And I am going to take you to the house for death scene examination now. Do you remember when you arrived there at house four?

A. Yes. It was on a few days after we had gotten to the dam. It was like 29 March. And we arrived midday.

Q. Was that the first scene you went to?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Go ahead.

A. It was around noonish time period. We started that morning at the Haditha dam at 0400 in preparation to go on the convoy. But it took us some time to get to the actual firm base. From there, we went out to house four in a convoy with Marines that were our escorts and security. Upon arrival, I could recall hearing some screams, a bit of a ruckus while the Marines approached the house and cleared it for us to enter.

Q. Did you attribute those screams to anything? You said you heard screams. Did that cause anybody alarm?

A. Well, we knew this wasn't a planned entry into their home for them. It was planned on our part, but they did not know we would be arriving at their home on that day. So it was definitely a surprise to the family, an unexpected surprise. And of course, they were not met at the door by us agents; but they were met at the door by the Marines that were our escorts. So I think that threatened a couple of the women.

Q. Where were you when the Marines entered the courtyard to do the security for your team?

A. I was standing outside of the gated area in front of house three and four.

Q. Continue.

A. Once it was explained, you know, why we were there, we were invited in the home. I met with the head of the household, the lead male, if you will, and explained to him who we were. I showed him my credentials and asked him if there was anybody in the household that had information that happened that day or that saw anything that day.

Q. Were you the first NCIS agent to actually approach any of the people in that house?

A. No. Actually, I believe that was Mr. Cranfield. He was closest to the door than any of us. I was standing out with Agent Platt and Blane. And the forensic consultant -- it was Mr. Cranfield that was actually in farther than we were into the courtyard area.

Q. So he was the first one to actually address the Iraqis that were present at the house?

A. Yes, sir, I believe he was -- the first of the NCIS agents. The Marines actually addressed them first.

Q. Are you aware of anything that was taken out of the house by the Marines before you entered the courtyard or entered the house?

A. No. No. I remember there was some sort of mention of a magazine. But I never saw one. That could be my memory of my interview with the family members because a magazine was brought up during the description of what happened on the 19th. But I did not see anything removed from the house.

Q. Go ahead. You said you were talking to the head of the household. Describe him. Who was he?

A. The head of the household, he was the only remaining son of the elderly couple that lived in that home. And he was the brother to the four deceased that were killed in that home on 19 November 2005. So he explained to me -- I asked him if he had been at the home. He said, No, I was not here; but my mother -- he was referring to his mother and father and sister-in-law would have information about that because they were there. So I asked if I could interview them.

Q. Do you remember his name?

A. His name is Yusuf Aiad.

Q. And was there an IA somewhere in the NCIS investigation report with an interview with Yusuf?

A. I believe he was interviewed at a later time individually, not by me. But his name was within my IA when I documented what we did at that home on 29 March.

Q. Sorry. Go on. After you finished talking to Yusuf.

A. After I finished talking to Yusuf, he spoke to the family members. And he advised me that they would speak to me. He said, I think my mother and my sister-in-law will talk to you. He specified me and pointing at me. I think, again, that was just because I was the only female of the group. So I was invited into the living room. And I sat down on one couch while the rest of the family members sat across from me on two sides of the walls of the living room while I conducted the interview with the assistance of the interpreter.

Q. Who was the interpreter? Do you remember his name?

A. He went by Sam. I know he was with Titan Corporation.

Q. You said you started the interviews. Was everybody in that room when you did the interviews?

A. Not initially. The father, the elderly male of the home, Yusuf's father -- he explained to me that his father was ill, had recently had a stroke, and was upstairs resting. However, eventually later on during the interview, he did come down and join the rest of the family and participated in our discussion.

Q. Paint the picture for me. If you don't remember all the names, that is fine. But you are sitting in the living room getting ready to conduct an interview. Who is all in there at the very beginning stages of it?

A. Yusuf is in there sitting with the women. And his mother Kajida [ph] -- I don't know if I am pronouncing it right -- and his sister-in-law Najlah, her son Khalaia. He is about 14-years-old. And there was a little one, a little tyke about two years old that they were holding and taking turns passing around. Eventually, also Yusuf's wife joined us. She wasn't initially in there. But she same came not long afterwards. And her name is Rhona. And then the elder father who came down later on. Right now, his name is just not -- it's Aiad or something like that.

Q. So Najah, Ehab, Nagham, and Khalaia, they were all in the room together when you began this interview?

A. Yes.

TC[Maj Erickson]: I was searching for what the heck I am talking about here. What it is, sir, is the results of interview, which I believe is 11A of the defense's submission? So it would be whatever exhibit it is under 11A. Is that what you have?

IO: I found it.

Questions by Major Erickson continued:

Q. Special Agent Mannle, I am not going to have you go over the entire results of interview because the IO does have that to read. But I do want to go over the actual conduct of the interview because I want you to explain to the IO why you had all the witnesses that you talked to present at the same time that you were interviewing. In other words, everybody was there?

A. Right. Typically that is not how we would conduct interviews. We would take one witness at a time separately. However, given the time constraints we were dealing with, an hour is what we were given by the Marines as our safety net of time. I knew with six different people, there was no way I would be able to divide that up, especially given the time it took for translating. So that was the most efficient use of time. And that is how I had to proceed with what I thought was the best option.

Q. Did it seem like one person kind of took lead in the interview? Did one person seem to do most of the talking?

A. Absolutely. Najlah, the sister-in-law of Yusuf, she is one of the women -- she is a widow to one of the deceased from house four. She did most of the talking.

Q. And kind of walk us through the conduct of the interview. How did it go back and fourth? Just give us an idea of how the conversation went.

A. Basically, I started out by explaining who I was and what our purpose was there that day and then wanted to go through with them what happened. I explained we would be using an interpreter to do that and that it was very important that they tell me just what they knew. And if they didn't know something that they need to tell me, I don't know, I didn't see that, I didn't hear that. In other words, not fill in any blanks, but just give me what they knew, what they saw, and experienced that day. Actually, that scene was repeated throughout the interview. I kept asking the translator to help me with some of the clarifications when I had questions. But initially what I did is I kind of went through a narrative question process with them and let them go through what happened. And then I went back to the beginning and asked for some clarification.

Q. Okay. Up to the point that you interviewed these Iraqi witnesses in their home, your understanding of the facts of house four, was that solely based on the Marines' account of what happened in there?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you have any reason to doubt that account?

A. At that point in the investigation, no.

Q. So how did you go into this interview then with the Iraqi witnesses? Did you go into it with facts you knew with regards to the Marines' account?

A. Yeah, exactly. That is all I had to go on. So I asked them to start with what happened that morning from the moment they woke up. They quickly went to their memory of the IED going off and the noise that that created and the ruckus that created. Then they went to the Marines approaching their home.

Q. When you got to the portion where their story didn't jive with the Marines' account or didn't compare to the Marines' account, what did you do?

A. I would ask the translator to repeat the information. I would say, Are you sure all these people -- because the first disconnect, obviously, was that most of the Marines said it was all women in house three when they approached. And according to what Najlah and what the others were saying, it was just she, her husband, and her son that lived there. That was different right away. Who was where and when was completely different. So I asked for clarification, because this is a family that shares two homes that are connected by one courtyard. So I wanted to be sure that she knew where everybody was. And that was explained, Yes, we live in this house, not anybody else. It was my husband and my son's home. We were the only ones there. There were no other women in the house when the Marines first approached. So we went over that a couple of times. That is when I realized this is going to be a very different version of events.

Q. So every time there was a different version of events that the Iraqis gave you based on what you knew the Marines already said, would you challenge the Iraqi witnesses at that time?

A. Well, yes. I would ask the translator, can you ask them this again, can you ask them this other question again in a different way. I was trying to do that because I recalled from the training we had that Iraqis don't necessarily think or give information like we do. They don't do it in a linear matter sometimes. So I wanted to be sure I was asking the right questions to make sure I was understanding them correctly. So I would ask sometimes a question one or two or sometimes three different ways to make sure it was the same consistent information. They kept giving the same answers. So I never sensed that they were frustrated with anything I was saying. But I could tell they were wondering, Why doesn't she understand this, several times. But yes, I would challenge them, not in an aggressive interrogative manner, but definitely in a way that was making sure I was getting the right information.

Q. Physically, how did you present yourself to these witnesses?

A. When I first entered their home, I had my long arm and a side arm on my person and, obviously, a Kevlar helmet and the whole nine yards. But I wanted them to feel more comfortable as I was interviewing them. So I did take off my helmet, and I did take off my long arm, and placed them underneath the couch. There was a little bit more of a comfortable rapport to be developed with them.

Q. You said earlier in your testimony that at first, you only thought you would get an hour to do this death scene examination at house four. Did it last only an hour?

A. No. It lasted longer. We obviously wanted to stay as long as we could. We were going to go by what the Marines sensed was going on outside and the intel that was being gathered while we were in there in the house conducting the investigation that we could. So what happened though was I remember looking up at one point when I was getting towards the end, and I still wanted to go over some more things, but there was a Marine signalling with his finger going in circles, You guys got to wrap this up. We got to get out of here. About 40 or 50 minutes before I ended the interview, my colleagues that were conducting the death scene examination, they also took longer than they intended because they found more in house four than they thought they would after all that time period had gone by. So we all spent more time than we initially thought. And we were all pushing the envelope, because for us, the right thing to do was to get as much information as we could. But when the Marines said we got to go, we went. And within a few minutes of stepping outside their home, an IED went off. So when that happened, the Marines on ground just yelled for us to take cover. And the nearest thing -- it is an Armadillo is what they call it. I don't know the technical term for that military vehicle. But Mr. Cranfield was with me. We ran towards that. That was it, and we called it a day. You are right. We did exceed it, and it lasted like a little over three hours.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, I went over this before with you with regards to what Marines took out of the house when they performed a security check for your team before you went into the house. During the course of your interview, did you hear about any weapons in that house?

A. Well, during the course of the interview, there was a discussion about the weapons that were removed from their homes on the day of when the shootings occurred.

Q. Go ahead and go over that for the IO.

A. Sure. One weapon, according to the Iraqi families, was provided to the Marines from house three. Najlah's husband and she went over with one of the Marines to their home to retrieve the AK-47. This was done after they were questioned about whether the families had any weapons in their homes. Two of them responded positively. So one of them was Najlah's husband. I believe his name was Jamal. They went and got his AK-47, five rounds, and a magazine. They brought that and gave it to the Marines. The Marine flung that AK-47 over his shoulder. Then her brother-in-law, who is a traffic officer in Haditha, she stated that he also said, I have an AK-47. That came out of house four. So he also went in with a Marine and retrieved that AK-47. She didn't mention anything about a round or a magazine though. So he came out and provided -- same thing. She said they slung it over their arm or shoulder. So according to the family members, the Marines that approached their homes that day were provided the weapons from the homes. However, when this topic came up, the elderly father that was in the room I was interviewing did state he did not provide his weapon that he had locked away in the house until ten days or so later when Marines came back. And he provided at that time where he retrieved it from the position it was still locked in the house.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, that is a third AK-47 we're talking about. Right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that third AK-47 the grandfather said belonged to him?

A. Yes.

Q. And he said that wasn't confiscated until ten days later?

A. Yeah. He was approximating ten days. But yes.

Q. But definitely after 19 November?

A. Yes. And what was interesting was that the translator recalled that because he was the translator on hand that came to the house when they did retrieved it.

Q. Can you tell the IO where the AK-47 was stored or where the grandfather said it was stored?

A. I believe he told me it was stored in one of the panel doors of the closet.

Q. Where was that closet located?

A. In the bedroom where the deceased bodies were known to be found and where their DNA was found.

Q. Did you do any follow-up on that third AK-47 to find out if in fact that did exist?

A. We attempted to run down all those AK-47s. That would be a total of three. Well, in doing so, we had a number of reports from the Marines that we interviewed from that battalion of an AK-47 that they thought they saw back at the firm base on that day. They assumed it had been turned in. But there wasn't any, for lack of better words, good chain of custody from the point where the Marines that reported shooting in houses three and four that they retrieved the AK-47s. There is no chain of custody that is easy to follow from house four to theAK-47s that were turned in and eventually were returned to the Haditha dam.

The process the Marines had on hand was if they collected any weapons from locals out in town, they would bring them back to the firm base. The firm base armorer would take care of them, lock them up, and then every week or two, would take them to Haditha dam. We reviewed the log books that they had. There was nothing documented for weapons retrieved from this platoon for that day. There was documentation from weapons received from Weapons Platoon, but not from Wuterich and Sharratt's platoon. Well, we also tried -- well, we talked to the armorer.

They said, Ma'am, there is no way we can tell you whichAK-47s they were, even if we had a record of showing they arrived from that day. We couldn't get them for you because what they do is they reissue them to the Iraqi army soldiers from there. And they don't keep any, like, tracking from that point on.

Q. And that is as far as you went with regards to tracking down the weapons?

A. Well, we also tried – well, we talked to the armorer. They said, Ma’am, there is no way we can tell you which AK-47s they were, even if we had a record of showing they arrived from that day. We couldn’t get them for you because what they do is they reissue them to the Iraqi army soldiers from there. And they don’t keep any, like, tracking from that point on.

Q. Did he tell you anything with regards to what EOD would do with weapons when they were turned in to them?

A. What who would do?

Q. EOD, Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit.

A. I don't recollect that, no.

Q. Moving on. Did you hear anything else with regards tothat house and those interviews with regards to anyother types of weapons or anything that could be relatedto a weapon found in that house?

A. No.

Q. What about this magazine that you said in the beginning of your interview that you heard something about a magazine?

A. Right. As I was sitting there conducting an interview, I heard something about a magazine being discussed. I never saw one. It would have been the Marines that first entered the home to clear it if there was anything. I just remember hearing in the background a discussion of it. I can't tell you who, other than I remember a couple of Marines off to my left talking about it. And that is my memory of hearing it. But I didn't get that information from any of my colleagues. I know if we would have a weapon there, we would have wanted to seize that, obviously. But I don't recall seeing anything, a weapon being seized. I didn't even see the magazine. I just remember hearing some discussion about it.

Q. Did you hear anything about a hunting rifle or anything of that nature in that house?

A. No, sir.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, I am going to take you now to -- you have left the death scene examination in an explosive manner with the IED going off and taking cover. Did you go right back to the dam from there?

A. No. We went to the firm base.

Q. That is Firm Base Sparta?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do once you got back to the firm base?

A. Once we got back to the firm base, the Marines advised it was mandatory that we attend the debrief with them, their patrol debrief. So we went over that. During that debrief, now that this topic might have come up -- I don't recall anything about a magazine or an AK-47being discussed there. But after the debrief, the next thing, the sergeant that was in charge -- I am sorry I can't recollect his name -- he said, you know, We're going to have another brief before we take the agents back to the dam later that evening. They weren't going to do that until it was dark. So we had a few hours at the firm base. But we spent the evening basically just getting chow. And I spoke to the interpreter for awhile, just getting his background. He spoke pretty good English. So I was curious.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, let's take you back to -- the actual course of this investigation is going outside the death scene examination. What did you do at the dam towards this investigation, interviews, things of that nature?

A. At the dam, that was pretty much where we conducted all reporting business and documentation, briefing one another, forming investigative plans of what to do next. But one of things that I was a participant in was interviewing on Lance Corporal Sharratt regarding the U.S. Army questionnaire that they provided us to ask them. I also assisted towards the end of an interview with Lieutenant Kallop.

Q. Were you involved in any other interviews at the dam?

A. At the dam? I think that's it.

Q. So as far as you are aware, you were only involved in two interviews?

A. Right.

Q. Were you involved in any other interviews regarding Lance Corporal Sharratt, like with Special Agent McDaniel?

A. No. That was conducted before the second team's arrival. That was just when the first three agents on ground were there.

Q. So you did not participate in that interview at all?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now we're not going to go over it in great detail, but kind of give the IO an idea of what Lance Corporal Sharratt's interview was that you did participate in.

A. Okay. During the time period we were there, the U.S. Army approached us and advised us that they wanted to interview the Marines involved in the shootings from November 19 regarding their training and background, regarding School of Infantry, Rules of Engagement, and so on. They had a 29 questionnaire that they wanted us -- actually that they wanted to do the questioning for. We were adamant about maintaining a rapport with these Marines and wanting to conduct those questions and the questioning of them ourself. So I know that that was negotiated above my level, but the Army did agree to allow us to conduct the questionnaires on their behalf. I was tasked with interviewing Sharratt on that particular U.S. Army questionnaire.

Q. And did anything with regards to what happened in house four come up during that interview?

A. No.

Q. Did you talk about anything with regards to what happened on 19 November 2005 in that interview?

A. No.

Q. Give us an idea real quick, just the environment of that interview. Where did it take place, what was the environment of that, if you could give a brief description of the Marines?

A. Sure. We were limited for space. We didn't have any regular office space. The office we worked in was the same room where the male special agents slept in. So being short on space, we were stuck with basically what the command would allow us to use at the dam. In the spaces the other agents were using, which was pretty much on the first floor of the Haditha dam, those were being filled and used. So since I had a spare room where there was no other individuals in it, we utilized my room where I bunked to interview Sharratt. So --

CC[Mr. Myers]: With all due respect, I think that is Lance Corporal Sharratt.

Questions by Major Erickson continued:

Q. Special Agent Mannle, just real quick, it's Lance Corporal Sharratt when you refer to him, if that's okay.

A. Yes. Lance Corporal Sharratt sat on the chair. Agent Platt was present in the room.

Q. Do you remember any bathroom breaks or smoke breaks or anything of that nature?

A. I don't believe that Lance Corporal Sharratt took a bathroom break, but I do recall him requesting a smoke break. I remember that because I said, Hey, I can go use my balcony. Just watch out for where I missed spitting with the tooth paste or something like that, and he laughed. But yes.

Q. Do you remember how long that interview took?

A. It wasn't very long. Not quite three hours, I would estimate.

Q. Okay.

A. The only reason it took that long was I had to retype every question that the Army gave us. They didn't have like a disk we could use to just upload their questions into our computers.

Q. Special Agent Mannle, what is your current role in this investigation?

A. I am the case agent.

Q. Describe what a case agent -- what they are responsible for.

A. Basically, the case agent writes all the reports. We call them report of investigation. But they are the interims. What it does is it takes all the information and summarizes all the investigative actions that are conducted in the field so it can be read in one cohesive document. And there is one responsibility for major report writing on a case. And then also the case agent coordinates the efforts as much as possible under the supervision of seniors of all agents involved, especially in this case. We had agents in Iraq working, California, and then later on the east coast. Actually, agents all over the United States were on it. So coordinating those efforts and informing them of the case and making sure they are asking the questions that we needed to be asked on a case when they were not, themselves, as familiar with it.

I would identify any leads that would need to be done in the case. And I would write and forward those leads to the agents that we need to conduct those. I created the investigative plan, attended all meetings on the case, briefed the case daily to our seniors, and conducted all briefings at the government level on this case, and kept the agents that were working on it informed of each other's products when they were doing new interviews so that they were up to speed on the information so they could ask better questions, if you will.

I also ensured that the evidence would be sent to Camp Pendleton to our field office there as part of the taskforce that was formulated and attended all the meetings for that.

Q. When did you assume the role of case agent? Do you remember the date?

A. That decision was actually made when I arrived back to the U.S. from Iraq. That was about not quite a month later, mid-April.

Q. Mid-April 2006?

A. Right. What they did do, I should note to give my co-case agent credit here, Agent Tony Blane out of Camp Pendleton was designated as the point of contact from Camp Pendleton. And we worked together as co-case agents. But most of the responsibilities were with me at our headquarters in terms of the writing and briefing of the case.

TC[Maj Erickson]: Just one second. I am going to turn you over to defense counsel now.

CC[Mr. Culp]: Your Honor, can we take a quick comfort break?

IO: Sure. Special Agent Mannle, can we call you back in ten minutes?

WIT[SA Mannle]: Yes, sir.

IO: This session is in recess.

The Article 32 investigation recessed at 1114, 12 June 2007.

The Article 32 investigation was called to order at 1124, 12 June2007.

IO: This hearing is called to order. Mr. Culp, you may examine the witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by Mr. Culp:

Q. Agent Mannle, can you hear me?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I am going to start with what kind of lawyer were you?

A. Sir, I practiced family law.

Q. Could you please tell the investigating officer, pretend that he doesn't know what titling means to an NCIS agent.

A. What titling means?

Q. Correct.

A. Subject titling?

Q. Correct.

A. Subject titling is when we identify someone as being a potential suspect in an investigation. We would title them as a subject. That is identified in our paperwork as S/John Doe.

Q. And you would also indicate what they are the subject of what crime. Correct?

A. Yes. We do that with sort of a code or numbering system, if you will. In this particular case, subject would stand for a homicide investigation -- or death investigation is actually what it stands for.

Q. Who is responsible for the titling decision?

A. That is usually done at the senior level, management level.

Q. Could you please tell us when that titling decision was made for Lance Corporal Sharratt.

A. The first report that was written in this case was when I returned -- in terms of an interim, that is – and that is when we subject line -- and co-subject line is what Lance Corporal Sharratt would have been. So that would have been in April. And the date I am not 100% sure on, sir. But if I look at my paperwork, I could get that to you.

Q. So on 19 March, he wasn't titled as the subject for murder. Correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And on 24 March, he wasn't titled as the subject of murder?

A. That is correct.

Q. But when you came back from your interviews that were done on 28 and 29 March, sometime shortly thereafter, he was titled for murder?

A. Well, in April, not in March. Yeah, he was.

Q. Was that after Agent Platt had interviewed Nagham and Ehab?

A. To be sure, I would have to be look at the date of the first ROI interim, which I can grab if I am allowed to.

Q. Please.

A. The first date of 12 April is when we officially subject titled, if you will, and co-subject lined the Marines involved in this shooting. So as I recall, Agent Platt interviewed the other two women from house number four that first week of April. So yes, it would be after Agent Platt's interview as well.

CC[Mr. Culp]: Your Honor, I just okayed her to look at a document.

IO: That is fine.

Questions by Mr. Culp continued:

Q. So when Agent Platt came back from his interview with Ehab and Nagham, someone made a decision to title Lance Corporal Sharratt for murder?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you involved in that decision?

A. I recall being involved in the discussion, yes. The decision was made by our managers.

Q. And that was based on, at that time, the Iraqi allegations and what else?

A. The Iraqi allegations, the interviews of the children that were interviewed in the case, and some of the evidence that was collected.

Q. Stop right there, please. When you just said "children," did you just mean to say that part of the analysis that was used to determine whether or not Lance Corporal Sharratt would be titled for murder came from the children that came out of house one and house two?

A. No. House number four, there was a child, 14 years old. His name was Khalaia. He was one of the witnesses that was interviewed as well.

Q. Khalia wasn't interviewed until January of 2007. Right?

A. No. He was part of the interview that I conducted on 29 March.

Q. Well, let's pull up those ROI, or NCIS calls it --

A. The investigative action?

Q. Correct. Can you point out to me the part where Khalaia is talking in this five-page document?

A. Well, during the portion that his mother gave, he would sometimes interrupt and add what he recalled as well. He did also advise me that he remembered the Marines directing them at gun point. I specifically remember him interrupting his mom to say that he picked up two different types of shell casings from the home.

Q. Could you go to page 3.

A. Okay.

Q. And go to the bottom of page 3, paragraph H. Isn't that Najlah who says she picked up the shell casings, not Khalaia?

A. Najlah recalled seeing them. But the little kid is the one that said that he picked them up. But none of them ever kept them. They threw them away.

Q. You just forgot to put that part in there that Khalaia said he picked them up?

A. Well, I believe it is in my notes as well. But I am trying to find the paragraph you are talking about.

Q. If you could just direct me to any part of this investigative action where you attribute some speaking to Khalaia, that would be helpful to me.

A. Page 4, section H, titled "BDA," it states Khalaia recalled picking up two of the small shell casings and four of the larger.

Q. Paragraph H?

A. Yes. Page 4 of investigative action dated April 1, which summarizes the interview I conducted on March 29.

Q. Okay. So the decision to title Lance Corporal Sharratt came from the interviews that you conducted on 29 March and the interviews conducted on 6 April?

A. Right. And also attempts to interview and interviews conducted later in Al Asad of the shooters and the results of those interviews. Collectively, the decision was to title all individuals that were involved in the shootings of houses one, two, and four.

Q. Kind of a group titling decision?

A. Somewhat, yes. But since they were all involved in the shootings, the only exception was Lieutenant Kallop. He was not titled at that time.

Q. You mentioned Al Asad. Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why don't you tell the Article 32 officer what type of interview took place at Al Asad with Lance Corporal Justin Sharratt.

A. He was met with Agent Wright, who is a polygraph examiner.

Q. What were the relevant questions that he was asked during that polygraph exam, Agent Mannle?

A. I believe there was only one or two. And I don't know because I wasn't present. But they were along the lines of what he saw, I think, when he was in the house. But to be sure, you would have to ask Agent Wright.

Q. Does it ring a bell that the question would be, Were you lying when you said you saw a man pointing an AK-47 at you in house four?

A. Yes, that sounds right.

Q. The results of that polygraph indicated no deception on his part. Isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. And still, based upon the interviews of the Iraqis, and those Iraqis being all the ones that you interviewed collectively on 29 March, and then Ehab and Nagham on 6 April, you decide to title Lance Corporal Sharratt along with the other folks in this case?

A. Yes, NCIS did. We did it collectively, the supervisors and those involved in interviews.

Q. I would like to start talking about the interview on 29 March. Okay?

A. Okay.

Q. You said that you went to the bottom of the Haditha dam, and Agent Maloney directed you to practice what you would do if you went to this house and encountered people.

A. I didn't hear the last part of it. But he did direct us how we would conduct the death scenes, yes.

Q. Fair to say that you were going to encounter two basic groups of evidence at house four, people and forensic evidence?

A. Well, we didn't know that we would. We didn't know who or how many people would be there when we approached. But we knew that there was a potential that we could at any of the houses.

Q. If you were going to recover any evidence from house four, that would be either testimonial evidence from witnesses or forensic evidence from walls and floors. Is that fair to say?

A. Yes.

Q. And you practiced who would measure what wall and who would measure the bullet holes and who would do the laser analysis and all of that. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your job?

A. I was going to be note taking, and I was going to be measuring as well, and if they needed assistance with any potential scrapings.

Q. Who was set aside to tackle 50% of what may be encountered of this evidence, and that is testimonial evidence?

A. Who was that assigned? I was the only one who conducted the interviews.

Q. Who was determined when you were doing these dry runs, these mock forensic examinations in Haditha dam, who had been pinpointed, earmarked, if you will, to conduct the interviews?

A. Well, nobody was pin marked. There was discussion that if we met anybody to be interviewed, and if there was females among them, that I would be the one to attempt to do the interviews. But that was the extent of discussion before we left.

Q. You are a qualified NCIS agent?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't it true that it is contradictory to everything you have ever been taught to conduct a group interview of a bunch of people who may or may not be witnesses to a crime?

A. No. Depending upon the situation. Ideally, yes, you are right. We want to do it separately. But given that situation, the ideal was not possible.

Q. Well, let's talk about that for a second. You never did any dry runs about what you would do if you encountered six, seven, eight people in that house, did you?

A. No, we did not.

Q. So it was sort of a spontaneous thing to put them all in a room and interview them collectively?

A. Not really -- I guess. It was a last-minute thing we could do at that time.

Q. Right. Who was the leader? Which Iraqi citizen would you characterize as the leader of the discussion amongst Yusuf, Aiad, Khalaia, Najlah? Who was leading them?

A. Well, I first have to say that Yusuf definitely was in charge in terms of our ability to even approach his family members. It was through him that I gained permission. So he was the leader in terms of who was in charge. But in terms of who answered my questions, the strongest speaker was Najlah.

Q. And then other folks, such as Khalaia and Aiad, they would chime in?

A. They would. I remember the mother of the four deceased chimed in quite a bit too.

Q. So you were getting this one collective story each bringing various pieces of the puzzle to you?

A. That is correct.

Q. And when you heard something that was of significance to you, you asked the interpreter to re-ask that question just to make sure you got it. Right?

A. Right. Or actually, I would ask him to ask it sometimes in a different way to make sure they understood the question.

Q. Did you believe, as a good investigator, that that maybe cluing them on to what you considered to be important, that you would ask those questions more than once in different ways?

A. I don't know what they were thinking about what my process was. But they didn't appear to be afraid. Initially, they definitely were afraid; but by the end, they were more comfortable with the questioning.

Q. And did you not believe that, by definition, having this group interview with all of these Iraqi citizens present at the same time to hear bits and pieces of each other's story, that that would compromise the integrity of the story for all time?

A. No. I mean, if anything, the family had no idea we were coming. There is no way they could have prepared what they were going to say to me. It was very last minute to them. And their memory of what they had, and sometimes in their actions, were re-living it and kind of getting up and showing me with hand movements. So I don't think it affected their memory of what they were telling me, to do in a group like that.

Q. Well, what did you believe had happened? Why did you go to this house? What did you learn from the investigation that would cause you to go to house four?

IO: There are multiple questions within that one.

Questions by Mr. Culp continued:

Q. What did you learn from the 15/6 investigation that caused you to need to go to house four to conduct the investigation?

A. Well, in a statement that Sergeant Wuterich provided to Lieutenant Colonel Watts, he stated that he was behind Lance Corporal Sharratt when Lance Corporal Sharratt saw everybody in there. And he didn't portray himself as shooting in there. However, in Sharratt's interview conducted with us, he advised us that Sergeant Wuterich did shoot. So we knew we had a difference in story right there. So we needed to go and see if there was going to be two different kinds of casings in there based on their stories, because both of them did have the same story regarding what weaponry was brought into that home but not about who shot. So we wanted to see what we could find. After four months, we weren't exactly hopeful. But we did find a decent amount of evidence there. That was the main reason for going there, that and there was four deceased found in that house. So knowing their bodies were found there, that was the death scene itself, we needed to go there.

Q. Okay. Answer me this question, please: Did you ever go to Agent Maloney or any of the other agents that were there and say, Look, we need to attempt to pull some of these people off to the side and try to interview them? Did you ever do that?

A. No.

Q. Isn't it true, Agent Mannle, that as you were listening to the Iraqi version of what allegedly took place in house number four, you went to Agent Maloney and Agent Brady, who were conducting a forensic examination in the bedroom, and said, Look, here is what the Iraqis are saying happened in this house? Did you do that?

A. At one point, I did advise them of what they had told me because I thought they needed to know while they were looking in the room. Since there was a diverge in the information received, I did tell them. And I remember them coming in as well and asking me about whether they knew anything about English writing being on the wall. And then I remember them coming to tell me they were going to need to leave to go to houses one and two and that Mr. Cranfield would stay with me. So there was short conversations, but never at any time did I ask for them to assist me in the interview.

Q. Did you tell them what the Iraqis were alleging? And the answer to that is yes?

A. I don't think I gave them the whole version. I told them that it was definitely --

Q. Well, you told Special Agent Maloney and Special Agent Brady that the Iraqis were alleging that the four men were separated from a group and marched into house four where they were shot.

A. I told them they were separated in a group, but I never said the family told me they saw them shot or anything like that, because the family didn't say that.

Q. No. The question was you told Agent Maloney and Agent Brady that the Iraqis were alleging the four men were separated, marched into the house, wherein they were shot.

A. That is correct.

Q. And didn't Agent Maloney and Agent Brady tell you then, on the spot, that the forensic evidence that they were discovering in that bedroom did not support that version of events?

A. I don't recall them telling me that at that point.

Q. Do you not recall Agent Maloney and Brady telling you that it was their determination based upon what they were finding in house four in that bedroom that the Iraqi men in that room controlled that room? They were in control of that room at the time they were shot. Did they tell you that?

A. No. They didn't tell me that.

Q. Would that have affected your titling decision if they had told you that?

A. Well, I didn't decide to title anybody, me myself.

Q. Would that have affected your recommendation as regards to the titling decision?

A. No. Because we would have still had two different versions of events. To title someone doesn't necessarily mean that you actually believe they committed the crime. They are suspected of being involved in it but not necessarily for sure they did it. We don't make those kind of judgments. That is what the court system is for.

Q. Right. There were two people not in the group interview of 29 March that were later interviewed by Agent Platt. Correct?

A. Can you repeat that?

Q. There were two females, Ehab and Nagham, who were not interviewed on 29 March as part of the group interview?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. They were interviewed separately on 6 April?

A. That is correct.

Q. Isn't it true -- first, tell me how long this group interview lasted in house four.

A. The group interview, it began at 12:19ish and ended around 3:30, 3:00 p.m. So approximately a little over three hours.

Q. Over this three-hour period, none of the Iraqis mentioned a group of four Marines that came back and took Kahtan's suitcase, did they?

A. Actually, I think I asked them about Jordanian passports. For some reason, that had come up in the investigation. And they said they didn't believe any of their folks had Jordanian passports. But one of them was going to be travelling. But yeah, you are right, I don't have that document. I recall that coming up during the interview. But nobody mentioned the suitcases being removed, just their body and the smoking. I remember that coming up.

Q. I would like to stop right there. Before you went to this interview on 29 March, you had a statement that had been taken from Lance Corporal Sharratt on 19 March. Correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. You weren't the case agent at this time though. Right?

A. No. At that point, sir, no one really was. We just had the team leader. We were all working the case. And they needed to identify a case agent by the time we got back to write the first ROI interim. But at that point, nobody was identified as a case agent.

Q. But Lance Corporal Sharratt said in his statement of19 March that he had taken a suitcase that had contained some passports in it. Correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And another person who was present at the scene on19 November, that would be Lance Corporal Salinas. Correct?

A. I believe Lance Corporal Salinas did not go into house four according to all three of the Marines involved.

Q. I will be more surgical in my questions. Lance Corporal Salinas accompanied Sergeant Wuterich and Lance Corporal Sharratt to the vicinity of houses three and four. Correct, Agent Mannle?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Q. And on 18 March 2006, Lance Corporal Salinas gave a statement and indicated that Lance Corporal Sharratt had indicated that they were Jordanian passports in the suitcase?

A. Yes.

Q. So in your mind, on 29 March 2006, when you were conducting the group interview, a question of the utmost significance was in your mind. And that was what suitcase was taken and why would there be Jordanian passports. Correct?

A. I remember asking about the Jordanian passports. I may have not asked -- I don't think I asked about the suitcase.

Q. Agent Mannle, I would like you to just take a second and think about this for a second as to whether or not you asked this group of Iraqi people in house four whether or not you asked about this suitcase.

A. Okay. If I could, I will look over my notes.

CC[Mr. Culp]: Your Honor, at this point, I think 55 -- I would like to go ahead and give the court Defense Exhibit 55, which is the notes that she is looking at.

IO: These are Agent Mannle's notes?

CC[Mr. Culp]: Yes, Your Honor.

IO: Any objection?

TC[Maj Erickson]: No objection, sir.

IO: Is this my copy, or is this the one you want to be the exhibit?

CC[Mr. Culp]: Can that be both for right now, Your Honor?

IO: All right.

CC[Mr. Myers]: Excuse me. I would like to find some evidence. I would like, with your permission, to leave the courtroom so I can do that.

IO: As long as your client permits you to leave.

ACC: Yes.

IO: You may go.

WIT[SA Mannle]: Well, I don't have it in my notes about the suitcase. The only part that came up about the Marines returning was when they came back, took photos, and took their bodies in bags.

Questions by Mr. Culp continued:

Q. Right. That was in the evening. Correct?

A. Correct. That was later on after the initial entrance.

Q. So all of these Iraqis together collectively did not mention the fact that a group of four Marines had come and taken a suitcase?

A. That is correct. Or if they did, I did not document it.

Q. But you would agree that the suitcase with Jordanian passports was an issue of particular interest to you before you went to this house?

A. Yes, it would have been.

Q. Because it would indicate what, if a suitcase full of Jordanian passports were taken from house four, to you?

A. Well, basically it would indicate involvement and a need to traffic foreign passports. So that would be suspect activity.

Q. So Jordanian passports in a suitcase sort of indicate likelihood of insurgent activity?

A. Right.

Q. I didn't see myself -- I make mistakes a lot -- in this investigative report that there is any mention of a question or answer regarding Jordanian passports. Can you direct me to that?

A. No. You are correct. I didn't ask about the suitcases. But I remember asking did anybody in the household have or hold any passport that was Jordanian. And I know that that kind of drew some curious looks. But they just said, No, we don't know anybody to have anything. That was it. You are right. That is not in my notes or documentation. But I do recall that.

Q. What kind of curious looks?

A. Oh, on their part? They were just looking at each other. This is my interpretation of their body language, but where is that question coming from. They are looking at each other, Do you know, do you know. And the translator told me they don't know of anybody having any other passport.

Q. Did you ask Agent Platt to go to house four and interview Nagham and Ehab? Did you do that?

A. No. Basically what happened is I documented that there was two women that were not interviewed. And I advised Mr. Cranfield that we need to make an attempt to find the one that out of the city and make a re-attempt on the interview of the one that was too scared to speak tome that day. So in the investigative plan, that was definitely listed as a priority to do. I didn't personally order Agent Platt to do that. But that was definitely one of the parts of my investigative plan that I wanted completed. And he happened to be the agent that was sent to do it.

Q. Again, before you made the decision to title -- I take that back. Strike that question. Before the decision was made to title Lance Corporal Sharratt, the statements from Nagham and Ehab were considered?

A. All information before April 12 would have been taken into consideration. All the investigative action andthe results of would have been taken into consideration.

Q. Now, Nagham and Ehab brought to the table a new piece of information that no one in the group interview had revealed to you. Is that right?

A. What are you referring to?

Q. The group of four Marines that came and took the suitcase that belonged to Kahtan who coincidently worked on the Jordanian border, that piece of information.

A. Correct, although we had heard it once before from the Marines. But yes.

Q. Did you feel that Ehab and Nagham's statement that the suitcase was taken by a group of four Marines and that it was Kahtan's and he worked on the Jordanian border, did you think that tended to corroborate what Lance Corporal Sharratt had told you on 19 March?

A. Actually, I didn't interview Lance Corporal Sharratt on19 March.

Q. When I say "you," I meant NCIS.

A. Yes. A suitcase was in that house would corroborate what he said he found in there.

Q. We have already covered that suitcase with Jordanian passports tend to indicate insurgent involvement. Right?

A. Correct. But I don't believe the information that the women provided was that it was filled with Jordanian passports.

Q. Exactly. So what steps did you take, Agent Mannle, to determine whether or not that suitcase that was taken belonging to Kahtan who worked on the Jordanian border may or may not have contained Jordanian passports?

A. We interviewed every Marine in the battalion. And the information that we obtained from the Marines that were involved is that the passports that were collected that day were likely mixed up by Salinas who never saw them himself. The scenario was that Lieutenant (sic) Laughner from HET had to approach a female in another home that had been cleared by Marines from the same platoon who did have, I believe, a number with something like 20 to 30 type of passports and money on her person and was detained and questioned. That was what the information that had gone around the battalion before these Marines were interviewed by NCIS.

But there was no connection made to any passports being in house four by any of the Marines that went back there. Laughner himself reported that he went to house four and picked up all identification and found nothing but Iraqi identification on the deceased.

Q. Staff Sergeant Laughner said he found two ID cards. Correct?

A. I don't know how many he found in there. But he did find ID cards in each of the homes where deceased were found, yes.

Q. And Staff Sergeant Laughner told you that he did not take a suitcase of any sort and get any sort of passports from house four?

A. Right.

Q. Now, you understand that two AK-47s were taken from house four. Correct?

A. Yes. That is according -- well, the Marines reported different numbers. One reported three. One reported two. The other reported one. The family members reported two.

Q. Who is the Marine who said one?

A. I believe that is Wuterich said only one AK-47 from house number four. But you have to remember that was the information we have always had was just what he provided to Lieutenant Colonel Watts. Lance Corporal Sharratt was the Marine that said there was two AK-47s from house four. Salinas advised there were three AK-47s from house number four. Tatum advised he received two from Sharratt, which were handed to him after the ridge line incident occurred. So you have a variety of numbers being reported.

Q. Chaotic day. Right?

A. Sorry, sir?

Q. It was a chaotic day, 19 November 2005?

A. All of this is in reference to 19 November 2005, yes.

Q. And Lance Corporal Stafford said he had two AK-47s handed to him. And he is the armorer. Right?

A. Yes. He stated two AK-47s were turned to him while he was near houses one and two. But he does not recall who gave them to him.

Q. I am going try to work myself back to the passports. Did NCIS believe that there were AK-47s taken, given all the Marine's testimony and the Iraqi testimony concerning that?

A. Right. It would appear that some amount of AK-47s were recovered from that house and by other Marines that day that were involved in other activities.

Q. And you never found any sort of log for those weapons that were taken from house four. Right?

A. Well, sir, we did find a log. But the log did not contain any documentation that correlated with those weapons taken from house four being obtained from the Marines, from Lance Corporal Sharratt, Wuterich, and Salinas's platoon. The only documentation that the log contained showed that around that time period, the Marines from the Weapons Platoon and 2nd Platoon had obtained AK-47s around that day or on that day, but none from the Marines in the platoon that Wuterich, Sharratt, Salinas, and Tatum belonged to.

Q. Thank you. So the necessary conclusion that NCIS made -- because you believe that AKs were taken from house four -- is that somehow they got mixed up and there is no accountability for weapons that actually did exist?

A. Right. There is nothing we can direct it to. So it is a lack of tight record keeping to verify it.

Q. Now let's go to the passports. Lance Corporal Sharratt said he took a suitcase containing passports. And Salinas said that Lance Corporal Sharratt said that they were Jordanian passports. Correct?

A. Yeah. I believe that is what he reported.

Q. When you got the information back from Special Agent Platt that Nagham and Ehab now were bringing new information to the table that the group interview didn't reveal that Kahtan's suitcase was taken and he worked on the Jordanian border, what conclusions, if any, did you draw?

A. Well, it did confirm what the family had told me, which was that Kahtan did work outside of the city and that he was visiting. And that is in my IA.

Q. So it corroborated the Iraqis' statements?

A. Well, the one portion that I did. It also corroborated what had been reported before, that a suitcase had been removed. But there was no corroboration as to Jordanian passports. When we did the other interviews, as I stated before, it became apparent that the Jordanian passports went around the battalion because a few people had heard about it that weren't even involved in the houses that day. But the only Jordanian passports that actually turned out hands on was from a woman of another home on that day that the HET team and another Marines on another fire team were involved with.

Q. Agent Mannle, I don't want to be contentious with you. But it is probably much easier for everyone to understand my point and the answer to that point if you just answer the question that I asked. Okay?

A. Okay.

Q. My question is: Was it of any significance to you – I asked you if it was significant that Ehab and Nagham were reporting this very important piece of evidence that the Iraqis in the interview didn't provide you. Did you consider that significant?

A. Yes. It corroborated prior information that we had.

Q. Let's say it corroborates two things. One, it corroborates the Iraqi version that Kahtan worked outside the city. That was important. Right?

A. Sure.

Q. But it was far, far, far more important that it corroborated what Lance Corporal Sharratt said, that he had taken a suitcase full of passports and that he had told Salinas they were Jordanian passports. That was very important, wouldn't you say?

A. Sure.

Q. Because we have already concluded Jordanian passports are moving down the road towards insurgent activity. Right?

A. Yes. It could be a flag towards that.

Q. Was it of any significance to you at all that in this whole group interview, Yusuf, Aiad, Najlah, Kahtan, that nobody mentioned to you this striking piece of information that Nagham and Ehab brought to the table?

A. It wasn't disconcerting in that what we did know before we went out there was that everyone of the victims, including Kahtan, had been run through the known insurgent databases by the Marine Corps, and all names came up as negative. So we didn't have information indicating that he was. It was disconcerting.

Q. Let me ask that question one more time.

A. Sure. Go ahead.

Q. You have two interviews, actually three. A group interview --

IO: So you are going to change the question? You didn't ask the same question again.

CC[Mr. Culp]: I got confused because the answer is so far from the question I asked.

IO: I didn't ask for an explanation. Are you going to ask a different question now?

CC[Mr. Culp]: Yes, sir. It is a new question.

THE WITNESS: I apologize. I might not be understanding it.

Questions by Mr. Culp continued:

Q. Special Agent Mannle, it is a significant fact that four additional Marines come and take a suitcase belonging to a guy who was on the Jordanian border. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. That is really significant. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to you, Nagham, Ehab, Najlah, Aiad, all those people were present at house three and four on19 November?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did it indicate to you that perhaps there was a lie to be discovered in that the entire group of Iraqis didn't say anything about the Marines coming and getting the suitcase even though you had specifically asked about Jordanian passports?

A. It could be perceived as that. But it was my failure to not ask them about the suitcase and get it clarified.

Q. Okay. After you learned on 6 April that this is what Nagham and Ehab were saying, that Kahtan worked on the Jordanian border, please tell the investigating officer, given the significance of that information, what steps were taken to determine who Kahtan worked for or where he worked?

A. I don't think we ever tried to find out who his employer was.

Q. Isn't it true that you didn't follow up with Kahtan's identity or profession in any way?

A. I think that's true. I am trying to remember if he was the one with the CAG badge or not.

Q. I am going to get to the CAG badge and Marwan in just one second.

A. Okay. Then you are right. No, we didn't.

Q. So that issue to this day, from the day it was learned on 6 April until today, has been a dead issue, never been investigated?

A. Who his employer was? No, we did not confirm that.

Q. Let's talk about Marwan, please. It was indicated to you that Marwan attempted to pull out a CAG card or Iraqi key personnel identification card. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew at this point that Sergeant Laughner had only taken two ID cards, neither one of which was a CAG card, from house four. Correct?

A. I don't know what type he had removed. But yeah, I didn't know at that time what he removed exactly, whether it was a CAG card or not.

Q. What they told you that day is that Marwan had it, he had this card trying to show it to the Marines but they didn't want to see it?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ask them for that CAG card?

A. No, we did not.

Q. And what steps did you take to determine whether Marwan actually had an Iraqi key personal identification card issued by the CAG?

A. We went to find the records that were maintained on the issuing of CAG cards.

Q. And there was a record. Right?

A. There was a record not of the initial ones that were passed out. According to the CAG officers involved at the time, they advised that they didn't start keeping a log or documentation of who they issued that to in the city of Haditha until after a certain point. So there was no way we could confirm whether he had received it before. He was not on the list from the point that they started. But I believe the point where they started was after this incident occurred in December.

Q. When did you go ask for the CAG card? What was the date for that?