The Article 32 investigation was called to order at 1353, on 13 June 2007.

TC[Capt Hur]: Staff Sergeant, if you could, please raise your right hand.

Staff Sergeant Michael Fields, U.S. Marine Corps, was called as a witness by the defense, was sworn, and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Captain Hur:

Q. Staff Sergeant could you please state you full name and spell your last.

A. My full name is Travis Michael Fields, F-I-E-L-D-S.

Q. And you are a Staff Sergeant in the United States Marine Corps?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You are currently on active duty?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. What is your current unit?

A. Alpha Company, ITB, SOI.

Q. And that's on base -- board here at Camp Pendleton?

A. Yes, sir.

Questions by the investigating officer:

Q. Staff Sergeant Fields, back in November of 2005, what unit were you assigned to?

A. I was assigned to 3d Battalion, 1st Marine, Kilo Company, 3d Platoon.

Q. And what was your billet?

A. I was the Platoon Sergeant, sir.

Q. As the Platoon Sergeant did you interact with Lance Corporal Sharratt?

A. Yes, I did, sir.

Q. And how long had you been the Platoon Sergeant before November of 2005?

A. Almost a year, sir.

Q. So did you go through all of the standard work up training prior to the deployment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As the Platoon Sergeant, were you responsible for ensuring that your Marines in the platoon were trained on the rules of engagement and use of force?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did you receive your training?

A. Well, sir, we received training prior to actually deploying, sir. We got classes from -- I am not sure exactly who it was. There was a Battalion wide stand down in theater, and -- actually the gym of Horno, Camp Horno. We received ROE training on that.

We also received Company level classes through the Company in the regimental theater across from the Battalion. We received classes at March Air Force Base prior to going on a SASO Ops there. And we also received training on ROE's, again, prior to going into Iraq and throughout Iraq, as far as reset training, sir.

Q. When did your unit arrive in Iraq?

A. We arrived in September of 2005, sir.

Q. So prior to November 2005, did you receive any other refresher training on the rules of engagement and the use of force?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you -- was this your first deployment to Iraq?

A. My second, sir.

Q. Did you notice any differences in the training in the rules of engagement from your first deployment to this deployment that you took in September of 2005?

A. Not really too much difference, sir, because when we arrived a year prior, the rules of engagement were basically the same, except for during the Battle of Fallujah. It was a little bit different, sir.

Q. When you were in the Battle of Fallujah, the use of force rules change. Is that correct?

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. So was it your understanding that the rules of engagement, pretty much, stayed the same, but the application of the use of force amplified when you were able to use deadly force?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the difference between what you understood the use of force in Fallujah was, as opposed to initially in September of 2005?

A. There wasn't too much of a difference, sir. Still positive identification was there.

Q. What does that mean?

A. Positively identifying someone with a weapon before pulling the trigger, and identifying someone as a threat prior to engaging them, sir.

Q. So you believe that positive identification meant that you had to identify someone as a threat before you could engage them?

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. In the Battle of Fallujah, were there areas that were considered free fire zones, in the sense that you could engage anyone, because they would be deemed combatants?

A. No, sir.

Q. So how does that differ?

A. Once we got into the country the second time, sir, there used to be individuals on the side of the road, digging on the side of the road at night time, and it was considered a hostile threat placing IED's.

The rules of engagement changed, therefore, after and it actually stated -- not actually stated, but one of the examples was given to us that said that we cannot engage individuals on the side and roads digging at night. We needed to first make sure that we positively identify a weapon, or them actually placing a bag into the ground, sir.

Q. So they made it more restrictive on shooting people that may be involved in placing IED's?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. Did you ever see training that you should fire warning shots to stop people from doing things before you could identify what they were doing?

A. Escalation of force procedures, yes, sir. We try to, first, notify, repeat, shoot to warn, shoot to disable, shoot to kill, sir.

Q. Is that what you taught your platoon to use, those steps in September of 2005?

A. Yes, sir. There was -- we went over escalation of force, and that was part of our reset training, sir.

Q. And did those rules of escalation of force apply while you were in combat operation?

A. In combat, yes, sir.

Q. So you told your Marines that they should use minimum force, even when they are taking fire?

A. No, sir. Once that are in a TIC, sir, troops in contact, it is the ground commander of the Marines on the ground to identify whether it's hostile or not, sir. They have to make that decision.

Q. So if your Marines in November were taking fire, and saw suspicious activity, maybe someone carrying a rifle, would you expect them to fire warning shots?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. Because they are suspected, and they believe they are carrying a weapon, sir.

Q. Was there an atmosphere within the platoon that caused people to be concerned if they did fire warning shots, they would get in trouble if they killed someone and later found out that they weren't truly hostile?

A. Not that I believe, sir.

Q. Were you ever trained or do you train your Marines to be cautious because you can get in trouble if you make the wrong call in the heat of the moment?

A. I've trained my Marines, basically, sir, the Marines on the ground, they have to make a decision. They know the rules of engagement. If they hesitate, first of all, they make a decision. Don't hesitate, and hopefully, that decision will be the right decision, sir.

Q. So you train your Marines, including Lance Corporal Sharratt, to make the decision, don't hesitate because they would get killed if they do?

A. Not necessarily, sir, but they have to make a decision on the ground.

Q. Did you provide examples to your Marines as what would commonly be viewed as hostile action in addition to the putting of bags, say, in a whole that was an IED suspected activity; did you have other examples?

A. Being fired upon, sir, is definitely hostile acts. Also, individuals -- another hostile act wasn't necessarily fired upon, you'd fire upon the individual, but individuals with bino's from looking out from windows, and stuff like that, you know, was considered a hostile act. But there are other ways.

Q. So basically, the training that you provided you platoon and received, if you saw a series of male – military aged males looking over a wall repetitively while you were taking fire from other areas, they could perceive that as potentially hostile?

A. You would need positive identification on what they were carrying, sir.

Q. So you are going back to they have to have a weapon in their hand?

A. Have to have a weapon, sir -- you try to make the decision, sir. If they see what the threat is. If they are behind you, where are they, are you getting fired upon that the time, and if they are looking, that could be considered a hostile threat. But however, the individuals on the ground have to make that decision, sir.

Q. Is the fact that an Iraqi male age -- military aged male has a weapon on him a hostile, act the fact that he has one?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because it could be a security guard or something like that, sir. If the weapon is actually pointed in your direction, you can consider that an actual hostile threat.

Q. With regard to clearing a building for security reasons, you are not taking actual fire from it, and you enter into the building just to make sure there is no one in there, what weapons system would you train your Marines to use to go into the building to secure it?

A. M-16's, sir.

Q. Did you ever train them on the use of using the nine millimeter pistol in leu of the M-16?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why would Marines in your squads have nine millimeter pistols?

A. Actually, the nine millimeter pistols were actually given to the Corpsman, and those were the ones that carried it. There was a select few, I believe four individuals. I carried one, the Company -- as you were. The platoon commander carried one, and the two Corpsmen, sir.

Q. So is a pistol is generally considered a personal protection device, as opposed to an offensive weapon for clearing a room. Is that how I'm understanding it?

A. It's not really a personal protective device. It can be used to clear a room, however, we mainly trained on M-16's, sir.

Q. What I'm asking is if the Corpsmen have it, and the leaders have a nine millimeter, we are not expecting you to, necessarily, engage the enemy in the same manner. You don't want our Corpsmen going around shooting people; Right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So was a nine millimeter primarily a protective piece of gear?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many rounds, typically, did your Corpsmen or did you carry with your nine millimeter pistol?

A. Thirty rounds, sir.

Q. Now, I don't know if you read the statements from some of the Marines that were in your platoon, but if a Marine from your platoon said that because they were in combat they could kill anyone they would see, would that be a misunderstanding of the rules and the use of force as you had trained your Marines?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If a Marine was to fire warning shots at someone that they believe was closing in on them with a weapon, would that be a misunderstanding of the application of the use of force in your platoon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any culture or understanding within your platoon that if they made a mistake, that they would end up being criminally charge if they made a mistake with their use of force?

A. The ROE, basically, you know -- understanding the ROE is very important. They understand their acts. If they do not act accordingly to the rules of engagement, they could be punishable under the UCMJ.

Q. I guess my question is it's probably difficult to understand because I didn't phrase it well, but in your training, I'm sure that everyone's told that you could be criminally charged if you violate these rule; right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It also sounds like part of your training was telling the Marine that they had to make a decision on the spot, based on available circumstances; right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they trained that they would be second guessed later by others when they made that determination on the spot?

A. Second guessed, sir, as far as like an investigation, or --

Q. Well, a person has a subjective view of the situation. I mean, that's their view. They take it in and use the parameters they use, and that can be an objective view. Another person who's not in that situation may look at it and say, yes, that was a good call or a bad call.

Were your Marines taught that someone else would be determining whether they made a good call or a bad call?

A. I believe that they knew that they could. I'm not sure if it was definitely gone over that someone else is going to be making that call, no, sir.

Q. Other than the incidents that occurred on November 19th, was there any review of the use of force in your platoon in other engagements?

A. Any questions of the use of force?

Q. Yeah, review of --

A. No, sir. Just escalation of force, sir, on how to try to minimize the use of escalation of force. I always start with notifying people, basically, getting out there to warn the individuals first before engaging them. We didn't really review it, but we just kept amplifying it, sir.

Q. So there is warning individuals before engaging the, that's if you weren't receiving fire from them?

A. That's correct.

Q. Were you teaching your Marines that if they saw what looked like someone might fire on them, but they hadn't fired at them, they can't engage them?

A. No, sir. In the event that someone actually has a weapon and they pointed it at you, you can take that as, pretty much, hostile.

Q. Is that what you train your Marines, that if someone points a weapon at him, consider it hostile and fire at them?

A. If you believe the threat is -- if you’re threatened, or a Marine is in danger of being wounded or killed, sir, yes, sir.

Q. So was that an example you had given me, that if someone points a weapon at you, shoot them?

A. Well, I am saying --

Q. I wonder if that's an example that you gave them. If not, that's fine. You didn't give them that example.

A. Basically, we talked -- in a way, yes, sir. We talked about how rules of engagement, nothing prevents you from using deadly force in order to prevent danger to yourself or other individuals.

Q. So the basics of your training is if you feel you are in danger or another Marine is in danger, use deadly force to eliminate that danger?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. An example you may have given if someone points a weapon at you, you can engage that person, and shoot that person.

A. An individual pointing a weapon at you can be considered to be hostile, yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever use the phrase "better to be safe than sorry," when engaging the enemy?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you understand there can be -- using a hypothetical, that someone that has a weapon in their hand coming towards you and not be hostile, but can you perceive it as being hostile, so you kill them or shoot them?

A. I understand that, sir.

Q. In those scenarios, based in your training, would you be in the right, even though that person wasn't hostile towards you?

A. It depends on if they are pointing that weapon at you. It all depends on the events that's gathered around that, sir. Also whether or not -- if that individual is handing you a weapon, because it's pretty known as you walk into houses, one of the first thing we are going to ask during SASO Ops is going in, you knock on the door, the individual -- the first thing they are going to ask is there a weapon here in the house. How many people are in the house, and that sort of things.

So individuals do, at some time, either go and try to pick up a weapon, but it all depends on the situation at that the time, sir.

Q. I guess, we are getting too far afield from my question, but in your training, do you train your Marines that when they go into buildings, sometimes Iraqi males may meet them with a weapon and not be hostile?

A. Iraqi males meeting you with a weapon, sir?

Q. That may not be?

A. No. It's got to be --

Q. I guess my question is that I've heard lots of testimony that Iraqi males have AK-47's in their home, almost like a birth right.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So it seems to me that if someone tries to enter my home and I have an AK-47 and I don't know who it is, I might meet them at the door with a weapon. Did you ever discuss that when you go into any of these homes, possibly the people inside of that home may be armed, even if they are not, necessarily, initially hostile to you.

A. Initially hostile -- there was an understanding that same thing, and it goes back to security. You've got to determine whether that individual is there for just security, or whether he is there for hostile acts, sir.

Q. I am trying to ask you about your training, but were the Marines in your platoon trained that when you go in a building, that they should anticipate that someone in the building may be armed?

A. To anticipate, no, sir.

Q. Why not, if almost every building had an AK-47 in it?

A. Haditha was pretty common. Everyone kept their weapons, pretty much, in a corner or under a bed. We really didn't run into any problems where individuals were armed. They only armed security personal there were, pretty much, at the hospital, sir.

In the event that someone comes to a door, depending on the situation and what's taking place outside, it could have been perceived as hostile. But it's all a judgment call on what's going on with the situation outside.

Q. So if I understand what you are telling me, in Haditha your experience is that it would be uncommon for the Iraqi male to meet you with a weapon, but it wasn't uncommon for them to have weapons in the building?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. So if you entered into a building, you would be – it would be uncommon for that Iraqi male to approach you with a weapon, but you would not be surprised if there was a weapon in the building?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So if an Iraqi male approached you with a weapon in his hand inside a building, you may view that as hostile, based on your experiences?

A. It all depends on the situation at hand. Did we knock on the door? How is his weapon? Is it slung, or is it -- you know. Is it pointing at you? It the weapon -- it's all a judgment call, sir, as far as where that weapon is and what is his intention. Is he running towards you, or is he casually walking up to you with a weapon in his hand.

Q. And you taught your Marines to make that analysis as quickly as possible?

A. Yes, sir. That's something you've gotta make, sir.

Q. And did you teach your Marines that if they made the call and they were wrong that they'd get in trouble, even though they may have truly believed that they were in danger?

A. I believe that was also known, sir, from the ROE's, just by, you know, understanding that you conduct yourself by the ROE, or you could be punished, yes, sir.

Q. I guess my question is: If you conduct yourself by the ROE, yet other people say you made the wrong call in that split second, were your Marines told they could get in trouble?

A. You are asking could they get in trouble, or were they trained to know if they could get in trouble, sir?

Q. These are really tough questions for you. What I am trying to get at is: Do you believe you are in a scenario that a Marine believes that there is a hostile act happening towards them, so they kill the subject. They believe the person coming at them is about to attack them. They believed that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Under the rules of engagement, that would be a lawful use of force as you had taught your Marines; correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. My question is: Did you also tell your Marines that even though you believed that, if five other people come and say no way, they wouldn't believe that, there are going to get in trouble because they made a call that other people wouldn't make?

A. I believe that --

Q. I'm talking about your training, what you told your Marines?

A. As far as I -- I'm not sure if that was ever gone all into, sir, in detail like that, sir.

Q. Okay. The reason I am asking is that if it was, there is possibility that someone may want to amplify their story in order to make sure they are not going to get in trouble by making you sound more hostile than maybe it was.

A. No, sir. I don't really recall ever going into detail about that, sir.

IO: Any questions in light of mine?

TC[Maj Erickson]: None from the government, sir.

CC[Mr. Culp]: Just a couple, sir.

IO: That's fine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by Mr. Culp:

Q. Is it fair to say that you put your best 240 gunner in the front vehicle on a convoy?

A. In the front, you want to utilize your maximum firepower, sir, in that front vehicle, due to the fact that is the front vehicle, yes. But it is all up to the squad leaders.

Q. In your platoon, a squad leader wouldn't put somebody on the 240 who wasn't very proficient with the 240?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that most of the people in the vehicle the turrets that are 240 gunners were also M-16gunners. So they had a weapon that they could fire one round at a car coming, a warning shot such as escalation of force?

A. Yes, sir. There are some, sir. However, everyone was trained as well on the 240.

Q. Right. Did you have personal knowledge that Lance Corporal Sharratt had a nine millimeter in the turret because he was a SAW gunner. So he had, basically, two fully automatic weapons that neither one of which could fire one round at a time, and he had it that day for escalation of force purposes?

A. I found out after the fact, sir; after that day, sir.

Q. And also, even after this incident, and the nine millimeter was given back to Dr. Witt, you and Lieutenant Kallop authorized him to have one issued to him for that purpose?

A. Yes, sir. We had one -- an extra one come to the platoon, and due to the fact that Lance Corporal Sharratt, actually, is pretty proficient with all weapon systems, we did allow it.

Q. Okay. When you did your MOUT training, Military Operations in Urban Terrain.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were thought to throw hand grenades and clear rooms with fire from fatal left to right or fatal right to left, one of those two?

A. In initial, basic MOUT training, yes, sir. That's given under situations that there is hostile intent coming from that house, yes, sir.

Q. What sort of training -- now, clearly, when you go into a room sometimes, you are not going to want to kill everybody in the room in Haditha?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But what sort of training did you get, sort of, shoot or don't shoot, you know, hostile -- when to shoot, or don't shoot. What kind of training did you get along those lines?

A. At March Air Force Base, sir, we received SASO training. We actually had individuals playing roles, who would also go into the shoot, don't shoot scenarios, sir. And if there were civilians in the area, and we would basically go in with blanks, sir. I believe there was an area that we utilize some munition rounds as well.

Q. I guess my question is was there ever training where insurgents were mixed with civilians in the same room?

A. Not too much, sir. I don't remember actually too much training on insurgents. You try identify them using the rules of engagement and positive identification as much as possible, and the situation at hand, sir.

CC[Mr. Culp]: No further questions.

IO: Any follow up, Major Erickson?

TC[Maj Erickson]: No, sir.

IO: Staff Sergeant Fields, thank you for answering our questions. You are free to watch the rest of these proceedings, or you can exit if you desire.

The witness was excused from the witness stand.

CC[Mr. Culp]: Could we take brief break?

IO: Sure. We also have to get someone on the phone, too. We'll take a recess.

The Article 32 investigation recessed at 1419, 13 June 2007.

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